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 GENERAL ABSTRACT 
 
Geurts, R. (2017). Interviewing to Assess and Manage Threats of Violence. Department of 
Psychology, University of Portsmouth. 
Persons who pose threats of violence can be rich sources of information for professionals 
charged with ensuring safety and security. The interviewing of threateners is thus considered 
important among such professionals, but research on the topic is scarce. This thesis seeks to 
advance current knowledge by proposing a scientific perspective on effective threat assessment 
and management (TAM) interviewing. What are the expected dynamics when interacting with 
persons who threaten to cause harm and, given these dynamics, which interview methods work 
best? A novel experimental paradigm was developed and employed in Studies I, II, and III. 
Participants were given a fictitious case describing two conflicting parties and were then asked 
to take on the role of the threatening party in a subsequent interview with the conflicting party. 
Study I (N = 157) examined whether individuals’ intent to actualise a threat becomes evident 
in how they verbalise that threat. Intent was manipulated across three conditions through the 
likelihood to actualise the threat: low likelihood (no intent: bluffers), medium likelihood (weak 
intent: conditional actualisers), and high likelihood (strong intent: decisive actualisers). Based 
on theory and research in cognitive psychology, it was predicted that decisive actualisers would 
provide the most detail about the implementation of the threat, followed by conditional 
actualisers, and bluffers would provide the least. The opposite trend was found: Persons more 
likely to actualise a threat were found to be less informative about its implementation. Study 
II (N = 179) tested the effect of two interview techniques (low vs. high suspicion-oriented) on 
the information provided by bluffers and actualisers. Drawing on psychological research 
examining lie detection, it was theorised that the need to be believed would be more urgent for 
bluffers than for actualisers. Hence, bluffers were expected to be more forthcoming when 
questioned about their threats and, in particular, when the questions communicated suspicion. 
As expected, bluffers provided more information in response to specific questions as compared 
to actualisers, especially with regard to implementation details (replicating Study I). However, 
the difference between bluffers and actualisers was not further accentuated by the use of 
suspicion-oriented questions. Furthermore, Study II explored whether threatening participants 
had used counter-interview strategies. Participants were found to be forthcoming, while also 
being strategic and adaptive to interviewers’ responses. Study III (N = 120) tested the 
hypothesis that rapport-based interviewing would be more effective for threat assessment and 
management purposes than direct interviewing. Against expectations, no differences were 
 found between interview protocols pertaining to the threateners’ use of counter-interview 
strategies, their information provision, or their willingness to pursue/discuss the threat. 
Furthermore, the study advanced Study II by exploring what types of counter-interview 
strategies threateners employ. Again, threateners were found to be both forthcoming and 
strategic. The most frequently reported strategies were to prove capability and to conceal 
information. Study IV was an online study that investigated whether threat assessments made 
by professionals were of higher quality than those made by non-professionals. Threat 
assessment professionals, university students, and laypersons assessed the risk for violence in 
three fictitious cases. In alignment with the literature on expert decision-making, it was 
predicted that professionals (vs. students and laypersons) would agree more with one another 
with respect to risk assessments and that their information search would more resemble 
empirically supported threat cues. The results supported both hypotheses. Taking the results of 
the studies together, it could be concluded that threateners are semi-cooperative interviewees, 
whose attitudes may not be impacted by general interview approaches (e.g. rapport-based, 
suspicion-oriented). Instead, the findings suggest that more strategic techniques developed 
from the perspective of threateners (which result in their motivation to be informative prevailing 
over their need to be strategic) are needed. 
 
Key words: threat assessment, threat management, investigative interviewing, true and false 
intent, human intelligence gathering  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Journal of Threat Assessment and Management recently published a special edition 
looking back at 25 years of research and practice in threat assessment and management (Guy, 
2015). Professionals in this field are concerned with assessing and managing persons believed 
to pose a threat of violence (Meloy, 2015). With a history of less than three decades, the field 
is still young. Modern threat assessment originated in law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies when, in the late eighties, the US Secret Service was challenged by the assassination 
of public officials. These incidents gave rise to one of the pioneering projects in threat 
assessment: the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP; Fein & Vossekuil, 1999). The ECSP 
examined 83 assassinators of Secret Service protectees and the overall aim was to reach an 
understanding of the perpetrators’ backgrounds, motives, and behaviours. The findings of this 
project resulted in the first operational guidelines on how to assess threats of violence (Fein & 
Vossekuil, 1998). Notably, the lessons learned then still prevail today (Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, 
& Berglund, 1999; Guy, 2015). These lessons were: (i) violence is presumed to result from 
understandable thoughts and behaviours, (ii) such thoughts and behaviours develop over time, 
(iii) they are shaped by experiences (rather than personality), and (iv) they are often evident in 
subjects’ behaviour prior to an attack. Identifying such behaviours is considered key to threat 
assessment investigations.  
Has nothing changed then over the past few decades? The answer is to the contrary; the 
field of threat assessment has developed rapidly. A number of archival studies followed the 
ESCP, which not only addressed violence towards public figures but also workplace violence, 
school violence, and domestic violence (mostly stalking). In addition to these domains, the 9/11 
attacks in 2001 brought about studies examining radicalisation and terrorist intent. Knowledge 
development resulted in jargon and threat assessment tools, and it allowed for specialisation. 
Today, practitioners can join associations for threat assessment professionals, attend 
conferences, enrol in training courses, and apply for certification. 
 When reviewing 25 years of work, it becomes obvious that remarkable progress has 
been made. However, such a review also identifies knowledge gaps and obstacles. Critiques 
have been raised with regard to widely used terminology and concepts (Hart, 2016a). For 
instance, threat assessment is often defined as assessing the risk for targeted violence, which 
implies that there exists non-targeted violence as well — but how does that differ from an 
accident? Moreover, subjects of concern are assumed to move through sequential stages of a 
pathway towards violence, but how long does it take to move from one stage to another? Can 
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subjects move backwards or skip stages? What are the factors pushing an individual to the next 
stage? And are there pathways to non-violence too? In addition to conceptual ambiguities, 
methodological difficulties limit the field. One such difficulty is that the base rates of risk 
factors are largely unknown (Gill, 2015). To illustrate, if there is no grasp of how many people 
in society experience feelings of hopelessness, it is hard to say whether or not feelings of 
hopelessness are typical for the offender population (and thus indicative of risk). Finally, I 
would allow myself to add one more issue to the list of future challenges: How can valuable 
information be collected from persons who pose a threat of violence? 
 The person posing a threat is arguably the richest source of information for threat 
managers. However, such subjects are also the most difficult sources of information. They may 
exaggerate or downplay their intentions, they may conceal or lie about their plans, they may be 
unable to give a comprehensive account (potentially due to mental illness), or interviewing 
them might increase the risk for violence (Meloy, Hart, & Hoffmann, 2014a). These conditions 
emphasise the need for skilled interviewing. Although the importance of interviewing is 
acknowledged in the literature on threat assessment (Calhoun & Weston, 2015; Fein & 
Vossekuil, 1998; Mohandie, 2014; van der Meer & Diekhuis, 2014), there has been surprisingly 
little research on how to conduct such interviews. Threat assessment interviewers might rely on 
findings from related disciplines such as suspect interviewing and crisis negotiation, or they 
might draw on customary knowledge that has emerged over time through experience (Hartwig, 
Meissner, & Semel, 2014). However, given the developments in the field, a unique research 
strand is merited on interviewing to assess and manage threats of violence. 
The central aim of this thesis is to contribute to a scientific approach for threat 
assessment and management (TAM) interviewing. Specifically, the thesis seeks to make such a 
contribution by: (i) reviewing relevant research and methodology in social, legal, and cognitive 
psychology, and thereby providing a theoretical groundwork for examining TAM interviews, 
(ii) introducing and testing an experimental paradigm for studying interview dynamics in TAM 
contexts, and (iii) reflecting on the outcomes of the empirical studies in order to identify future 
avenues for research. The content of the thesis is structured accordingly. 
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Defining Threats and the Scope of the Thesis 
 
Definitions 
Deep water, bad weather, political tension, and viral outbreaks — many insecurities can 
be threatening. However, these are not the types of threats examined in this thesis. Instead, the 
focus is on threats of violence. Violence can be defined as actual, attempted, or threatened 
physical or serious psychological harm that a person deliberately directs without consent 
towards another person(s) (e.g. Douglas et al., 2014). Note that this definition excludes suicidal 
threats. Moreover, according to this definition, all communicated threats should be considered 
violence, but not all violence involves threats. In addition, all harm that one threatens to inflict 
is violence as well. This can be physical, emotional, or financial harm, disturbance of peace, or 
persistent harassing behaviour.  
Within threat assessment and management, the term “threat” can mean two things. The 
first meaning refers to an act that communicates an intent to cause violence—the person makes 
a threat. Persons who make a threat are, in this thesis, indicated as threateners, a term derived 
from the act of threatening. The second meaning describes a situation of potential violence. In 
these situations, there is concern that a specific person will act violently—the person poses a 
threat (Fein et al., 1995). A person who poses a threat is a subject of concern, yet not a 
threatener. The concepts of posing and making a threat relate to each other as follows. Persons 
can make an explicit threat without posing a threat (i.e. they are bluffing). Persons can pose a 
threat without making a threat (i.e. they have harmful intentions but remain silent). Lastly, 
persons can both make and pose a threat (i.e. they have harmful intentions and communicate 
them). These three groups form the bulk of worrisome cases that professionals must triage. Note 
that persons can move from one group to another over time and/or in different situations. For 
instance, a person who makes a threat might be bluffing at first but then decides to carry out the 
threat when their threat is ignored. Threat assessments can thus require altering quickly, which 
is why assessment is considered a dynamic process (Meloy et al., 2014a). For the empirical 
studies in this thesis, participants always made a threat that they either meant to actualise or 
not. In other words, subjects of concern who conceal their harmful intentions have not been 
studied here (see the General Discussion for an elaboration of this topic). 
Further, the terms threat assessment and threat management are interdependent and 
often used interchangeably. However, they actually refer to different aspects of the same 
professional field. Threat assessment is the process of information gathering to understand and 
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evaluate a threat of violence, whereas threat management is the process of developing and 
executing plans to mitigate the threat of violence (Meloy et al., 2014a). Both terms are used 
throughout the thesis depending on the topic discussed.  
  Finally, this thesis examines threat assessment and management (TAM) interviewing. 
TAM interviewing is defined here as an interaction between a professional (e.g. law 
enforcement or health care officials) and a threatener. Typically, for the professional, the aim 
of this interaction is to collect information to assess the risk for violence or to recommend 
appropriate interventions, but the interaction can also be used to mitigate the risk for violence 
(e.g. reducing tension, building trust, reaching out). In line with this, the primary focus of the 
empirical studies has been on collecting information (Study I, II, IV) and a secondary focus has 
been on mitigating risk (Study III). 
 
Research Questions 
The current thesis rests on four broad assumptions. First, social and cognitive processes 
guide the behaviour of threateners when they engage with professionals about the threat they 
may pose. Second, such processes can be studied and understood by means of experimental 
research. Third, understanding the cognitions of threateners allows the interviewer to adapt 
his/her interaction techniques accordingly. Fourth, such adaptions aid threat assessment and 
management. These assumptions underpin the overriding research question of the thesis: How 
should persons who pose a threat be interviewed in order to assess and manage the risk for 
violence? The thesis builds on four empirical studies addressing direct and indirect aspects of 
this research question. Specifically, is it possible to detect verbal cues to deceit in threat 
statements (Study I)? Is it possible to interview strategically to elicit or enhance verbal cues to 
deceit in threat statements (Study II)? Which interview approach contributes most to 
information gathering and threat de-escalation (Study III)? How does professional experience 
contribute to the quality of threat assessments (Study IV)?  
 
Research and Practice in Threat Assessment and Management 
 
Two Strands of Research 
Experimental research on threat assessment is scarce. There exist some studies on 
threats as mechanisms of social control in an unpredictable environment (e.g. how threats can 
be used to influence a target; how targets react to threats; Milburn & Watman, 1981). More 
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recently, Taylor and colleagues (2013) conducted an experiment in which they analysed 
language as a means to detect insider threats. However, most empirical work in the field of 
threat assessment falls within the following two strands of research: archival studies and 
efficacy studies. Both types of studies address the same question. That is, is it possible to 
identify factors (e.g. behaviours, background characteristics) that are indicative for the risk for 
violence? However, the two strands of research approach this question from different 
perspectives. In archival studies, shared behaviours and characteristics are identified among 
samples of similar perpetrators (“Twenty out of 30 attackers of American celebrities were found 
to be psychotic”). The findings from such research are used to develop risk assessment 
instruments. In efficacy studies, these instruments are evaluated in terms of reliability (e.g. “Do 
different raters reach similar conclusions when applying the instrument?”) and validity (e.g. 
“Does the instrument differentiate between offenders and non-offenders?”). Both strands of 
research are discussed below. 
 
Archival studies. Archival studies in threat assessment have examined multiple 
domains of violence, such as public figure violence (e.g. Meloy et al., 2011), stalking (e.g. 
Rosenfeld & Harmon, 2002), terrorism (e.g. Corner & Gill, 2015), school shootings (O’Toole, 
2009), and workplace violence (e.g. Kelleher, 1997). Within each of these domains, specific 
risk factors could be identified. For instance, it was found that many stalkers who assaulted 
their victims had first directly threatened them (Rosenfeld & Harmon, 2002), whereas most 
school shooters were found to have leaked their violent plans indirectly to a third party (e.g. 
friend, classmate) prior to the attack (O’Toole, 2009). Moreover, employment instability is 
considered a risk factor for workplace violence (Meloy, White, & Hart, 2013), but it has not 
been found to be particularly significant when considering public figure violence (Meloy et al., 
2011). Instead, mental illness (primarily pathological fixation) appears as a critical factor 
among persons who threaten and attack public figures (Hoffmann, 2009; Mullen et al., 2009). 
Specifically, those who demonstrate a sense of grandiosity and self-entitlement were found to 
be more likely to harass celebrities (e.g. Dietz et al., 1991), politicians (e.g. Scalora et al., 2002), 
and royalty (e.g. James et al., 2009). When examining rates of mental illness among a sample 
of terrorists, high rates were found among terrorists acting alone (31.9%), but the number was 
almost 14 times lower among terrorists acting in groups (3.4%; Corner & Gill, 2015). These 
findings illustrate that risk factors can be more or less relevant within different domains of 
violence, and even within different subgroups of a specific domain of violence. 
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That said, many risk factors in threat assessment are not domain specific. Comparing 
checklists across domains, many of the same risk indicators become apparent (e.g. MacKenzie 
et al., 2009; Meloy et al., 2013). Examples of shared risk indicators are violent ideation, social 
isolation, mental illness (psychosis, depression), substance use, antisocial traits (narcissism, 
psychopathy), and a history of violence. More broadly, many risk factors in threat assessment 
resemble factors that are predictive of violence in general (Harris, Rice, & Quinsey, 1993) and 
of suicide (Hall, Platt, & Hall, 1999). This holds particularly true for factors that are historical 
(e.g. prior violence), clinical (e.g. mental illness), or social (e.g. support system).  
Furthermore, it has been suggested that, regardless of the domain, problematic 
behaviours of threateners evolve to violence along a similar pathway (Calhoun & Weston, 2003; 
Fein et al., 1995). This pathway consists of consecutive stages of proximity to an attack, ranging 
from grievance and violent ideation to preparations and the final decision to strike. It has been 
theorised that each stage is characterised by “warning behaviours” (Meloy, Hoffmann, 
Guldimann, & James, 2012). These are acute and dynamic changes in behaviour that constitute 
evidence of accelerating risk (e.g. buying a weapon). Empirical support for a pathway to 
violence and for warning behaviours is mixed. Some behaviours have been consistently 
identified in archival studies (e.g. fixation, leakage), whereas others seem to be drawn from 
anecdotes and professionals’ experience (e.g. novel aggression, energy outburst, see Meloy, 
Hoffmann, Roshdi, Glaz-Ocik, & Guldimann, 2014b, for an overview). Moreover, little 
research has been conducted on the sequence of warning behaviours (Gill, 2015; Hart, 2016a). 
The pathway to violence is portrayed by a single, one-way, consecutive sequence, but this 
assumption has not yet been demonstrated.   
 
Efficacy studies. Currently, the best validated threat assessment tools have been taken 
from the field of violence risk assessment. It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss 
the predictive efficacy of violence risk assessment tools as this is a research domain of its own 
(for an overview, see Heilbrun, Yasuhara, & Shah, 2010). Yet, some efficacy matters are worth 
addressing as relates to threat assessment.  
Threat managers typically make use of risk assessment instruments that fit the 
structured professional judgment (SPJ) model. The SPJ model relies on the discretion of the 
professionals, while providing structure to their judgments via empirically informed guidelines 
(Guy, Packer, & Warnken, 2012). SPJ tools detail risk factors for violence that have been 
identified by a literature review and these tools can be seen as a memory aid or recommendation 
for the professional who needs to assess and manage risks for violence. Examples of SPJ tools 
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are the Historical, Clinical, Risk management-20 (HCR-20; Douglas et al., 2014) and the Sexual 
Violence Risk-20 (SVR-20; Boer, Hart, Kropp, & Webster, 1997) used to assess the risk for 
general violence and sexual violence, respectively. A meta-analytic evaluation of the SPJ model 
revealed good levels of predictive accuracy and, hence, supported the utility of the model in 
assessing the risk for violence to others (Guy, 2008). However, these accuracy levels resulted 
mainly from studies on institutional violence and violent recidivism and it should be noted that 
the accuracy level might drop when predicting events of lower-frequency, which are typical 
within threat assessment (Meehl & Rosen, 1955). 
A few protocols developed specifically for threat assessment purposes exist. Examples 
are the Workplace Assessment of Targeted Violence Risk-21 (WAVR-21; White & Meloy, 
2010), the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol-18 (TRAP-18; Meloy, Roshdi, Glaz-
Ocik, & Hoffmann, 2015), and the Communications Threat Assessment Protocol-25 (CTAP-
25; James, MacKenzie, & Farnham, 2014). Although these protocols draw on empirically 
informed risk factors, they have yet to be extensively evaluated. To my knowledge, no efficacy 
studies have been published on the CTAP-25 and only one reliability study has been conducted 
on the WAVR-21 (Meloy et al., 2013). This study revealed excellent interrater agreement for 
the overall presence of risk factors but a large variability for the presence of individual risk 
factors. With regard to the TRAP-18, researchers concluded that the protocol appears promising 
for assessing radicalisation, but that it is not yet sufficiently validated to be utilised as an SPJ 
instrument (Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy, et al., 2015).  
In addition to evaluating threat assessment methods, some studies have examined the 
efficacy of threat management methods. In a study carried out by James and colleagues (2010), 
100 consecutive cases from the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (FTAC) were examined 
before and after intervention steps were taken. The FTAC is a joint police/health care centre in 
the UK that was established to assess and manage persons who pose a threat to public figures. 
The results showed that the level of concern was reduced from moderate/high to low for 80% 
of the cases (often because health care was offered). Similar success was demonstrated in a 
follow-up study consisting of a new sample of 100 cases (James & Farnham, 2016). A 
significant drop in the number of police call-outs, worrisome communication, and approach 
behaviours was found after (vs. before) FTAC interventions.  
On the whole, the efficacy of threat assessment methods is still far from being 
systematically evaluated. One reason for this is that the field is still relatively young and the 
amount of data available for such analyses is limited. Another reason is that threat assessment 
concerns low-frequency incidents, meaning that, for these incidents, there might never be 
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enough data available in one temporal-cohort to establish predictive accuracy (Gill, Horgan, 
Corner, & Silver, 2016). Finally, case specific information is often critical when interpreting 
risk factors. To illustrate, writing a farewell letter can be considered normal behaviour if one is 
fatally ill but becomes worrisome if the person is in perfect health. As it is impossible to capture 
all imaginable situations in a threat assessment instrument, it has been argued that threat 
assessment should be an inductive (or rather abductive) process, meaning that the specific facts 
of a particular case should guide the inferences made (Meloy et al., 2014a; Reddy et al., 2001). 
This approach, and related principles, will be discussed in the next section dealing with current 
practices.  
 
Current Practices 
The threat assessment approach that dominates today can be best described as a set of 
principles widely advocated over time. These principles reflect a mix of logic, professional 
experience, anecdotes, and research. Some issues discussed below have already been mentioned 
above but are included again for the sake of providing a complete overview of what is currently 
considered to be standard practice. 
It has been acknowledged that threat assessment is not about predicting who will or will 
not commit harmful acts but rather about triaging among a number of worrisome cases (Gill, 
2015; James & Farnham, 2016). The triage process should result in an assessment of the overall 
level of concern for potential violence (low, medium, or high). The term “targeted violence” is 
often used to stress that threat assessment concerns not random violence but rather violence 
resulting from deliberation (Vossekuil, Fein, & Berglund, 2015). However, some authors make 
no distinction between targeted violence and other violence as they employ a definition of 
violence that already includes a certain degree of deliberation (e.g. Douglas et al., 2014). 
Moreover, violent thoughts and behaviours are primarily shaped by experiences (not 
personality) and these can change over time and in different situations (Borum et al., 1999). In 
other words, risk for violence is presumed to be dynamic. This implies that it is critical to 
identify conditions that bring about a change of risk such as behavioural changes or an 
upcoming stressful event. It further implies that an assessment holds true only for as long as the 
conditions under which the assessment was made remain stable (Meloy et al., 2014a, b). Threat 
assessment professionals must therefore be aware of situational changes and update their work 
accordingly (Calhoun & Weston, 2015). 
For an assessment to be up-to-date, case information must be up-to-date. Information 
gathering is therefore considered a crucial aspect of threat assessment (van der Meer & 
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Diekhuis, 2014). The process of information gathering is guided by so-called “key questions” 
or “need to knows” (Calhoun & Weston, 2015; Vossekuil et al., 2015). These questions are 
supposed to cover all key areas that should be inquired about in order to make a fully informed 
assessment of a person posing a threat. The questions tap into, among other things, the subject’s 
motivation, intention, mental health, and capability to cause harm. Explicit threats of violence 
were found to be an unreliable indicator of risk as many persons who attack utter threats, yet 
many persons who utter threats do not attack (Warren, Mullen, & McEwan, 2014). Therefore, 
the common approach dictates that explicit threats should not be ignored and can be a valid 
reason for making a threat assessment, but they should not necessarily be interpreted as a 
threshold for concern (Reddy et al., 2001). 
Ultimately, threat assessment is meant to identify what types of intervention are needed 
to mitigate the risks of a particular case. Mitigating threats of violence is referred to as threat 
management and this task is considered equally important as threat assessment (Calhoun & 
Weston, 2015). Examples of different forms of intervention can be to monitor a subject of 
concern closely through police surveillance, to arrange security for the potential victim, but also 
to provide health care and support for the subject. Although threat assessment originated within 
the context of policing and protecting, a shift has taken place towards a more multidisciplinary 
approach in which collaboration between police, security, health care, and social services is 
particularly stressed (e.g. James & Farnham, 2016).  
 
Threat Assessment and Related Fields 
This section addresses the field of threat assessment in relation to three intersecting 
domains of research and practice: violence risk assessment, negotiation, and criminal 
investigations. It should be noted that the similarities and differences described below are not 
definite. Instead, while the fields overlap to some extent, the connections between them are 
subject to change and perspective. This section is not meant as an argument for any particular 
distinction over another, but rather as an attempt to position the topic of this thesis in a broader 
context.  
 
Threat assessment vs. violence risk assessment. Risk assessment is a large and 
established field and it could be argued that threat assessment is one part of it. The fields share 
an overarching goal: to assess and manage risks for violence. The differences between the two 
fields stem mainly from the fact that threat assessors and risk assessors typically operate in 
different professional contexts (i.e. law enforcement vs. health care) and they therefore have 
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different responsibilities. Whether or not the differences exist in practice and whether they are 
big, small, strict or fluid is debatable (Hart, Hoffmann, de Vogel, & Kropp, 2015). However, 
as the literature distinguishes between risk assessment and threat assessment, these differences 
are discussed here (for an overview, see also Meloy et al., 2014a). 
Threat assessment takes place in law enforcement/intelligence contexts and the 
assessments should aid operational decision-making (e.g. “Should this stalking victim receive 
security?”). Importantly, a person of concern in threat assessment is typically moving freely in 
society. This means that there is a short-term and urgent need to mitigate the risk for violence. 
Threat assessment professionals are thus required to make rapid assessments based on dynamic 
and ideographic risk factors (i.e. circumstances that are relevant at this very moment and in this 
particular case). Risk assessment, on the other hand, often takes place in health care and social 
services settings and the assessments are meant to aid legal decision-making (e.g. “Can this 
person be safely released from prison?”). The person of concern is typically being detained, 
meaning that there is no imminent risk for violence. This gives professionals time to collect 
information and make an assessment, but their assessment is intended to cover a longer time 
period. As long-term risk for violence is best predicted by static risk factors (e.g. psychopathy, 
criminal past), historical information is highly informative in risk assessments (Harris et al., 
1993).  
 
Threat assessment vs. negotiation. It could be reasoned that if negotiation is needed, 
it is too late for threat assessment. The task of a threat assessor is to foresee risk acceleration 
and to intervene before a conflict goes bad. The task of a negotiator is to reach a peaceful 
resolution when the conflict has already gone bad (Wells, 2015). In other words, threat 
management is meant to prevent a crisis, whereas negotiation is meant to reduce an ongoing 
crisis. Threat managers and negotiators are thus typically involved at different stages of 
escalation, which obviously affects their priorities (i.e. information gathering vs. de-escalation, 
respectively).  
That said, professionals in both fields operate in similar domains of violence (e.g. 
domestic violence, terrorism) and their work concerns similar issues (e.g. mentally unstable 
subjects of concern coping poorly with life stressors; Rogan, Hammer, & van Zandt, 1994). 
Engagement with subjects of concern is important in both fields, although more central to the 
field of negotiation. Literature on both threat assessment and negotiation acknowledges that 
problem-solving and information gathering during interactions with subjects of concern is best 
reached through affiliation development (Giebels & Taylor, 2010; van der Meer & Diekhuis, 
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2014) and that mistakes by the professional may negatively impact the outcome of the 
interaction (Meloy, 2015; Oostinga, Giebels, & Taylor, 2017). Although, thus far, it is only 
within the field of negotiation where such acknowledgements have been followed up with 
scientific research and training on communication methods (e.g. Vecchi, van Hasselt, & 
Romano, 2005).  
 
Threat assessment vs. criminal investigations. The field of criminal investigation is 
relevant to threat assessment thanks to its research on suspect interviewing. Threateners and 
other suspects arguably face a similar dilemma when interacting with law enforcement officials; 
they need to ensure they are taken seriously without being too specific about their intentions or 
deeds (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). Understanding the strategies and 
dilemmas of suspects under interrogation has proven to be of importance for developing 
successful interview techniques (e.g. Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). The current thesis builds on 
this line of reasoning.  
 
Research on True and False Intentions 
 
To anticipate risk, it is critical to understand which markers precede future actions. One 
such marker is intent. Malle and Knobe (1997) defined intent by directly asking people what it 
means to perform an action intentionally. This resulted in the following: an intended act is an 
act that one desires, has reasoned about in terms of consequences and skills, has decided upon, 
and is aware of while performing. The decision can be seen as a commitment or a belief that 
one is going to act. Intentions are always genuine but people may tell the truth or lie about their 
intentions. In research on true and false intentions, true intent therefore refers to statements 
about future acts that one truly intends to perform, whereas false intent refers to statements 
about future acts that one claims, but does not in fact intend to perform (Mac Giolla, Granhag, 
& Liu-Jönsson, 2013). 
However, not all true intentions result in action. Gollwitzer (1999) differentiated 
between goal intentions and implementation intentions. Goal intentions reflect what is desired 
(“I am going to live healthier”), whereas implementation intentions reflect the specifics of 
when, where, and how the goal should be realised (“I will eat 200 grams of vegetables every 
evening for the coming six weeks”). Implementation intentions also involve plans for self-
regulation, so-called “if-then” plans (“If I am going to dine in a restaurant, then I will have a 
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salad for lunch”). Gollwitzer (1999) suggested that holding goal intentions does not necessarily 
lead to goal achievement. Instead, people must operationalise how they intend to achieve their 
goals and how they will overcome the obstacles they may encounter during goal-striving. This 
suggestion has received strong empirical support. A meta-analysis revealed that implementation 
intentions help people to initiate goal-striving, to recognise and exploit goal-congruent 
opportunities, and keep a course of action by steering away from unwanted influences 
(Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Hence, implementation intentions were found to be better than 
goal intentions at leading to action and goal-achievement. Moreover, persons with no goal 
intentions were found unlikely to form implementation intentions (Sheeran, Milne, Webb, & 
Gollwitzer, 2005). These findings imply that implementation intentions may be unique to true 
intent.  
Given that implementation intentions precede behaviour, it would be helpful to threat 
assessment if implementation intentions could be detected. In broader terms, is it possible to 
detect true intent? This question is central to a new branch of psycho-legal research grounded 
in scientific work on deception detection (Granhag, 2010). Instead of examining lies about the 
past, studies have focused on lies about the future. In a pioneering experiment, passengers in 
an airport departure hall were asked to either tell the truth or lie during an interview about their 
upcoming trip (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011a). The interviews were coded and judged 
in terms of veracity. It was found that approximately 70% of statements of intent could be 
correctly identified as true or false based on the number of plausible details (fewer for liars), 
contradictions (more for liars), and spontaneous corrections (fewer for liars). A similar level of 
accuracy was found in a related study that also looked at true and false claims about the future 
(Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011b). Although a discrimination accuracy of 70% is nowhere 
near perfection, it is much higher than results from deception studies on statements about the 
past (54%; Bond & DePaulo, 2006).  
The number of statement details, contradictions, and corrections reflect cues that are 
studied in traditional lie detection research (Vrij, 2008), but they do not necessarily characterise 
intent. Subsequent laboratory studies have therefore turned to examining intention-specific cues 
to deceit. For instance, Ask, Granhag, Juhlin, and Vrij (2013) proposed that true intentions are 
goal-directed. Drawing on research showing that goal activation leads to positive automatic 
evaluations of goal-relevant cues (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004), it was predicted (and found) that 
persons who truly intend to achieve a particular goal evaluate cues relevant to this goal more 
positively as compared to persons with false intent (Ask et al., 2013). Moreover, planning is 
considered a defining feature of true intent (Granhag, 2010) and planning is related to the ability 
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to imagine future scenarios (Szpunar, 2010). Researchers who addressed the link between true 
intent and pre-experiencing the future found that persons were indeed more likely to activate 
mental images when they planned for an activity they truly (vs. falsely) intended to carry out 
(Granhag & Knieps, 2011; Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij, 2013).  
These findings are theoretically relevant as they suggest that different cognitive 
processes underpin true and false intent. However, cognitive cues such as positive evaluations 
and mental images are not often observable to outsiders and therefore cannot directly aid threat 
assessment. Of more practical relevance is whether or not markers of true intent exist that are 
detectable for professionals charged with assessing intent (e.g. border security personnel). For 
instance, does the truth reveal itself in statements about intent?  
Drawing from the Construal Level Theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010), it could be 
argued that people should talk about true intentions more concretely (as opposed to abstractly). 
CLT was originally developed to explain how people mentally represent past and future 
situations such as memories, speculations, hopes, and intentions. These mental representations 
are called construals and range from more concrete to more abstract. Concrete construals 
typically reflect the feasibility of an action (i.e. how to act), whereas abstract construals 
typically reflect the desirability of an action (i.e. why to act; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Vallacher 
& Wegner, 1987). CLT holds that construals become more concrete when they concern events 
that are more psychologically proximate to oneself. Psychologically proximate events are those 
that will take place in the near future (temporal proximity), at a location close by (spatial 
proximity), apply to oneself (social proximity), or are certain to happen (hypothetical 
proximity). Importantly, CLT proposes that the level of abstraction in mental representations 
affects people’s behaviours, evaluations, and predictions of events. Such secondary effects of 
mental abstraction levels are called “downstream consequences.” Numerous experiments have 
examined the assumptions of CLT and support has been found for the effect of psychological 
proximity on the abstraction levels of both mental representations and downstream 
consequences (Soderberg, Callahan, Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2014). These 
effects were found to be robust across time, research labs, and populations.  
When studying intentions (or threats), hypothetical proximity is particularly relevant. 
After all, a person who holds a true intention has decided to act, in contrast to a person who 
holds a false intention. Research has shown that proximity differences can reveal themselves in 
verbal statements. That is, people describe activities in more concrete terms when the activity 
is to happen soon (Liberman & Trope, 1998) and when the activity is more likely to occur 
(Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). Thus, it could be theorised that statements of true 
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intent (e.g. true threats) are coloured by concrete how-related details, whereas statements of 
false intent (e.g. bluffs) by comparison are characterised more by abstract why-related details.  
A series of studies have provided tentative support for this theory using variants of the 
following experimental paradigm (Granhag & Knieps, 2011). Participants were assigned the 
role of truth teller or liar. Truth tellers were given a neutral task to plan and carry out (e.g. gift 
shopping) while liars were given a mock crime to plan and carry out (e.g. hiding a USB-stick 
containing illegal material in the shopping centre). In addition, liars were told to prepare a cover 
story in case they were apprehended. The cover story resembled that of the truth tellers’ task 
and thus reflected a statement of false intent. After planning, but before executing their tasks, 
participants were apprehended and interviewed about their intentions. Truth tellers gave a 
truthful account, whereas liars told their cover story. Their statements were then analysed for 
markers of true and false intent.  
Results of these studies have shown that truth tellers provide comparably more 
information on how to implement their goal, whereas liars provide comparably more 
information on why to implement their goal (Mac Giolla, et al., 2013; Sooniste, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Vrij, 2014; Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2015). Moreover, studies have 
revealed that truth tellers provide longer and more detailed answers to unanticipated questions 
about planning (Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2015; Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps, & Vrij, 2013; 
Sooniste et al., 2014; 2015), are more likely to mention time management issues (e.g. “Let us 
split the group and divide the tasks”), and more often foresee potential problems pertaining to 
their future task (Mac Giolla et al., 2013). For a review of psycho-legal studies on true and false 
intentions, see also Granhag and Mac Giolla (2014). 
 
Research on Human Intelligence Interviewing 
 
Human Intelligence  
Human intelligence (HUMINT) can be described as information collected by 
professionals through interactions with one or more persons (Justice, Bhatt, Brandon, & 
Kleinman, 2010). HUMINT gathering is considered a core component of law enforcement work 
and counter-terrorism efforts (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). HUMINT can be used as evidence in a 
court of law if it is acquired in accordance with country-specific rules of evidence (e.g. the Fifth 
Amendment in the US). However, the literature typically distinguishes between evidence and 
HUMINT (Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010). Evidence is information 
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that contributes to the conviction (or acquittal) of a suspect, whereas HUMINT is defined as 
information that can be used to improve local or national security. Moreover, HUMINT (as 
opposed to evidence) is typically gathered outside custodial settings on a voluntary basis, can 
take place over the course of months or years, and can contain a covert component (for an 
overview of similarities and differences between HUMINT and evidence, see Evans et al., 
2010). The information obtained with TAM interviewing can be seen as HUMINT as it is 
typically used to evaluate the likelihood of an individual to commit acts of violence and, then, 
to prevent this from happening. Most research on investigative interviewing has focused on 
collecting evidence rather than HUMINT (Evans et al., 2014). The 9/11 attacks resulted in a 
shift of interest, but the impact of behavioural science on policies and practices within 
intelligence agencies long remained limited (Brandon, 2011). Emerging research on 
intelligence gathering is now gradually filling this knowledge gap (for a recent review of 
research, see Meissner, Surmon-Böhr, Oleszkiewicz, & Alison, 2017). Two research topics 
concerning HUMINT gathering may be particularly relevant to TAM interviewing: counter-
interview strategies and interview methods.  
 
Counter-Interview Strategies 
Counter-interview strategies can be described as all efforts by interviewees to manage 
the information they hold and to regulate the way they present themselves in interviews 
(Hartwig et al., 2010). The focus in this thesis is on verbal counter-interview strategies, which 
concerns the interviewee’s spoken communication with the interviewer. Such strategies can be 
generated by the interviewees themselves or result from instructions given to them by others. 
In both cases, counter-interview strategies are ways to steer one’s own behaviour towards 
desired interview outcomes, which can be seen as a form of self-regulation (Fiske & Macrae, 
2012). The need for self-regulation increases in aversive situations with uncertain outcomes 
(Fiske & Macrae, 2012). Legal interviews (whether these involve suspects, sources, or 
threateners) are typically uncertain and aversive situations because there are risks involved for 
the interviewee, such as the risk for prosecution (suspect), the risk for retaliation (source), or 
the risk for interference with plans (threatener). Hence, counter-interview strategies should be 
expected in such settings.  
A study of real-world interrogations revealed that terrorist suspects did indeed make use 
of counter-interview strategies and that the type of strategies used, differed across different 
terrorist groups (Alison et al., 2014a). For instance, Al-Qaeda inspired terrorists used retraction 
tactics (i.e. retracting previous statements) significantly more than right wing terrorists and 
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paramilitary groups, the latter of which more often responded to interrogations with passive 
responses (e.g. remaining silent, no-comment response) or by providing irrelevant information, 
embedded lies, or scripted responses. The use of such strategies reflects manuals produced by 
these terrorist groups (e.g. the Al-Qaeda training manual; the IRA Green Book). In these 
manuals, members are advised to anticipate the interview techniques employed by the police or 
to say nothing during interrogations.  
In addition to operational findings, experimental research has been conducted on 
counter-interview strategies with mock suspects. According to theory and research on self-
presentation, guilty and innocent suspects are equally motivated to make a credible impression 
(DePaulo, 1992; Hartwig et al., 2010). However, to avoid prosecution, guilty suspects must 
conceal the truth, whereas innocent suspects must reveal the truth. This difference is presumed 
to result in avoidant versus forthcoming counter-interview strategies, respectively. In support 
of this presumption, research has shown that guilty suspects are more concerned with 
maintaining control and thereby adopt avoidant strategies (e.g. avoiding incriminating details, 
keeping it simple), while innocent suspects are more concerned with providing correct 
information thereby adopting forthcoming strategies (e.g. telling the truth like it happened; 
Hines et al., 2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). Moreover, guilty suspects compared 
to innocent suspects (i) tend to use more (and more diverse) strategies (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007), (ii) are more aware of the risk for not being believed (Hartwig et al., 2010) 
and (iii) react more strongly to the possibility that there might be evidence against them 
resulting in pronounced withholding or pronounced forthcoming counter-interrogation 
strategies (Luke, Dawson, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2014).  
To develop effective interview techniques (including tactical approaches to detect 
deceit), it is essential to learn about interviewees’ counter-interview strategies. Such knowledge 
improves the interviewer’s ability to take perspective and consider the world from someone 
else’s viewpoint (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). Perspective taking allows for 
anticipation of the behaviour of others and professionals in legal settings could incorporate this 
skill into their interview techniques. They could use techniques that exploit the counter-
interview strategies of both truth tellers and liars to elicit cues that are indicative of guilt or 
innocence. Moreover, they could use techniques that reduce the use of counter-interview 
strategies by semi- or non-cooperative interviewees to elicit more information (Granhag, 
Hartwig, Mac Giolla, & Clemens, 2015). Such techniques are referred to as strategic 
interviewing techniques; see the next section for an elaboration on this type of interviewing.  
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Interview Methods 
Methods for investigative interviewing and interrogation can be divided into three broad 
categories: confession-oriented (or accusatorial) methods, information-gathering methods, and 
strategic interviewing methods (Hartwig, Luke, & Skerker, 2016). Confession-oriented 
methods are aimed at producing confessions. Police interrogation manuals (e.g. Inbau, Reid, 
Buckley, & Jayne, 2011), observational studies (e.g. Leo, 1996), and controversial war practices 
have revealed that this is often achieved using techniques that involve physical or psychological 
manipulation. Confession-driven interviewing is highly criticised within the research 
community. Not only does the method rest on an incorrect assumption of guilt (i.e. the suspect 
may be innocent), but the tactics are also considered immoral as they violate the suspect’s 
autonomy and consent (Hartwig et al., 2016). Finally, there is no scientific support for the 
efficacy of confession-driven interviewing, the method was even found to increase the 
likelihood of false confessions (Meissner et al., 2014). While such interview methods are still 
practiced around the world, several countries have adopted laws and interview standards that 
instead promote an information-gathering approach (e.g. Home Office 2003; Milne, Shaw, & 
Bull, 2007). 
Information-gathering methods aim at eliciting a complete and reliable account from 
the subject. This is done by establishing rapport and by using open-ended questions as well as 
direct, positive confrontations (Meissner et al., 2014). When information-gathering methods 
are used for deception detection, the focus is on eliciting cues to deceit that result from cognitive 
(rather than emotional) differences between truth-tellers and liars (Vrij & Granhag, 2014). One 
advantage of information-gathering methods over confession-driven methods is that the former 
build on theories of how people memorise and communicate information (Milne et al., 2007). 
A meta-analysis of experimental studies demonstrated the positive effects of information-
gathering interviewing: the likelihood of true confessions was preserved and, in some cases, 
increased (Meissner et al., 2014). Additionally, information-gathering methods reflect ethical 
progress, as the methods emphasise honesty, transparency, and respectful treatment of the 
suspect (Hartwig et al., 2016).  
When testing the comparative efficacy of information-gathering methods on 
information elicitation, a distinction can be made between direct interviewing and rapport-
based interviewing. Direct interviewing is the most basic information-gathering approach in 
which open-ended questions are asked in a business-like manner (Justice, et al., 2010). Rapport-
based interviewing is comparatively more advanced and can be described as a friendly 
interview style characterised by acceptance, empathy, and respect for the interviewee’s 
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autonomy (Alison, et al., 2014b; Saywitz, Larson, Hobbs, & Wells, 2015). Bull (2013) reviewed 
literature on characteristics that contribute to skilled investigative interviewing and concluded 
that the best information gatherers are those who can establish and maintain rapport throughout 
the interview. For instance, it was found that rapport-based interviewing reduced suspects’ use 
of counter-interview strategies (Alison, et al., 2014a), and led to an increased information yield 
(Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib, & Christiansen, 2013). These findings match field research in 
which offenders were found more willing to provide truthful accounts in response to humane, 
honest, non-dominant, and respectful interviewing (Kebbel, Hurren, & Mazerolle, 2006; 
O’Connor & Carson, 2005).  
 The most recent developments in human intelligence interviewing concern strategic 
interview methods. These methods go beyond information-gathering as they rest on the belief 
that a skilled interviewer understands and exploits the counter-interview strategies of the 
interviewee (Granhag et al., 2015). One example of strategic interviewing is to play on the 
expectations of the interviewee by asking unanticipated questions. Liars have been found to 
perceive it to be more difficult to answer such questions because they cannot draw from true 
experiences while truth-tellers can (Vrij et al., 2009). Another technique is the Strategic Use of 
Evidence (SUE) technique that builds on the notion that both guilty and innocent suspects must 
reveal information to be perceived as credible, but that only guilty suspects must also conceal 
information to avoid self-incrimination (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). The interviewer may 
exploit the conflicting mind-set of guilty suspects by withholding evidence from them, which 
leads guilty suspects (more than innocent suspects) to make statements that contradict the 
evidence (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). Moreover, strategic interview tactics have been 
developed to elicit information from interviewees while masking the aim of the interview, the 
so-called Scharff-technique (Oleszkiewicz, 2016). An interviewer using the Scharff-technique 
creates the illusion that s/he already knows all information interviewees hold, leading 
interviewees to believe they can reveal their information safely. Furthermore, the interviewer 
presents claims that only need to be confirmed or disconfirmed. This tactic enables the 
interviewer to elicit valuable information via a short (dis)confirming response only. Finally, by 
not pressing for information and showing little interest in new and critical information, the 
interviewer can hide from interviewees what information s/he is after. These tactics are 
considered particularly relevant for eliciting information in intelligence operations. Recent 
empirical work has provided support for the efficacy of the Scharff-technique (Granhag, 
Kleinman, & Oleszkiewicz, 2016). 
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A Novel Experimental Paradigm 
 
This thesis introduces a novel experimental approach with respect to TAM interviewing. 
Since planned acts of violence are extreme behaviours that occur infrequently, experimental 
research is uncommon in the field of threat assessment and management. Some may argue that 
high-stakes events cannot be investigated in a laboratory as artificial setups would limit the 
generalisability of the results. In this section, an explanation is given of why the employed 
experimental approach was chosen and how research based on this approach can contribute to 
existing knowledge on threats of violence.  
One lesson learned from anecdotal studies is that every threat case is different. However, 
managing such cases can be done systematically. The studies in this thesis do not investigate 
individual characteristics of threat cases, but rather the process of human intelligence gathering 
to assess and manage threats. As noted in the previous section, human intelligence gathering is 
nothing more than collecting information through interactions with people (Justice et al., 2010). 
Human intelligence gathering can therefore be viewed in the context of social and cognitive 
psychology (Evans et al., 2010). It is safe to assume that fundamental social and cognitive 
processes function similarly across populations. For instance, the avoidance-approach 
motivation (i.e. the motivation to approach positive stimuli and avoid negative stimuli) is 
central to human functioning and relates to important dilemmas and decisions that threateners 
face, such as to accept or reject a loss, to reveal or conceal information, and to follow through 
on a threat or not (Eliot, 2008). Moreover, applied research has shown that extremists 
commonly leave violence behind for very ordinary reasons such as burnout, feelings of guilt, 
missing loved ones, or longing for a normal life (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Even when dealing 
with persons with mental illnesses, it was found that simple matters such as helping them obtain 
social security benefits were effective in reducing risk (James & Farnham, 2016). These 
findings illustrate that despite deviant behaviours, the needs and drives of those who pose a 
threat might not differ from those who do not. This presumption, among other things, merits 
laboratory studies on threat management using a normal population.  
Furthermore, experimental research may contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
techniques underpinning threat management skills. Understanding a skill is not necessary to 
possess that skill; people can be good at something without knowing what exactly makes them 
good at it. The understanding, though, becomes important when teaching others. For instance, 
Hans Scharff was considered an outstanding WWII interrogator of the German Luftwaffe 
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(Toliver, 1997), but it was only 75 years later that his skills were taught to law enforcement 
professionals (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2017). This development is due to the fact 
that researchers became inspired by anecdotal evidence of Scharff’s effectiveness, then 
identified his tactics and tested them in laboratory studies (Oleszkiewicz, 2016). On a more 
general note, extensive research on interview techniques has led some police and intelligence 
services to take part in training sessions on science-based methods of interrogation (Meissner 
et al., 2017) and to adopt science-based frameworks for interviewing suspects (e.g. the PEACE 
model; Milne et al., 2007), for interviewing eyewitnesses and victims (e.g. Cognitive Interview; 
Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010), and for communicating in crisis situations (e.g. the 
Behavioral Change Stairway Model; Vecchi et al., 2005). Researchers within these fields have 
to deal with similar challenges regarding external validity as researchers within the field of 
threat assessment. However, such challenges have not deterred them from conducting 
experimental research or, more importantly, from translating research to practice and policy. 
That said, it is important to strike a balance between experimental control and external 
validity by mirroring critical real-life aspects in the lab. As a result, the following matters were 
addressed in the paradigm employed in this thesis. First, the act of threatening can be considered 
deviant behaviour, but it is reasonable to think that a person who makes a threat finds it 
acceptable (e.g. “I have no other choice” or “I must fight injustice”; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). 
To reflect this mind-set, the case given to participants was phrased in such a way that they 
represented the party who was morally right according to widely accepted values, threatening 
a party who was morally wrong. Second, the act the participants threatened to commit was not 
physically violent (for obvious ethical reasons), but was still damaging. For instance, 
participants threatened to leak information to the media or press charges in order to cause 
financial or reputational damage to a company. Third, in order to establish true intent, 
participants were led to believe they really could carry out the threat. Of course, participants 
understood this act was part of the role-play, but the critical part was that they truly believed 
they were going to follow their threat up with an act (e.g. delivering a USB-stick to an 
accomplice containing damaging video recordings). Fourth, emotional involvement was 
established via the content of the case (i.e. fighting injustice) and via the nature of the task (i.e. 
performing the fairly nerve-wracking act of interacting with an unknown person about 
conflicting interests). Fifth, the dependent measures of the studies were selected based on their 
practical value to threat assessment and management. Measures included for threat assessment 
purposes were the type, amount, and timing of the information provided by threateners during 
the interviews as well as their use of counter-interview strategies. As pertains to threat 
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management, the threateners’ willingness to carry out a threat was measured as well as their 
willingness to communicate with professionals about the threat.  
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CHAPTER 2: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 This thesis includes four empirical studies. Three of these are laboratory experiments 
(Studies I, II, III) and the fourth is an online passive-observational study (Study IV). The 
methodological parameters of the studies are summarised in Table 1. In the laboratory 
experiments, participants were interviewed about a threat they had made. The information 
provided during the interview (e.g. amount, type), the counter-interviewing strategies reported 
to have been used (e.g. type, change in strategy), and attitudes towards the threat and the 
interview (e.g. willingness to carry out the threat) were examined. The aim of these studies was 
to investigate how interviewing can contribute to threat assessment and management goals such 
as differentiating between bluffers/actualisers and increasing information yield. In the online 
study, threat assessment professionals and non-professionals assessed the risk for violence in 
fictitious cases. This study sought to examine how professional experience contributes to the 
quality of threat assessments.  
 
Table 1 
Overview of Studies Constituting this Thesis 
Study Method N k Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
I Lab  
 Experiment 
157 3 Threat Intent 
(bluffer vs. conditional actualiser 
 vs. decisive actualiser) 
Information Provision 
Time of Disclosure  
 
II Lab  
Experiment 
179 4 2 Threat Intent  
(bluffer vs. actualiser) 
× 
2 Interview Protocol 
 (high vs. low suspicion) 
Information Provision 
Time of Disclosure 
Strategy Use  
 
III Lab   
Experiment 
120 2 Interview Protocol 
 (direct vs. rapport-based) 
Information Provision  
Strategy Use 
 Willingness to Carry out  
Willingness to Interact  
IV Online  
Passive- 
observational 
133 3 Professional Experience  
(professionals vs. students vs. laymen) 
Agreement 
Information Search 
Note. N = participants, k = conditions. 
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Study I 
Study I introduced an experimental paradigm for studying verbal threats. The study 
examined whether true or false intent to actualise a threat manifests in the verbal content of the 
threat. Simply put, do persons with true intent to actualise threats (actualisers) formulate threats 
differently than persons without intent to actualise threats (bluffers)? Drawing on literature on 
true and false intent, it was predicted that threats reflecting true intent would be accompanied 
by comparatively more implementation details (how the threat will be actualised), whereas 
bluffs would be concentrated more on the formation of ideas (why the threat is posed). This 
prediction was based on the finding that people think and talk more concretely about events 
that are more likely to happen (Wakslak et al., 2006). Intent was manipulated across three 
conditions via the likelihood to actualise the threat: low likelihood (no intent: bluffers), medium 
likelihood (weak intent: conditional actualisers), and high likelihood (strong intent: decisive 
actualisers). It was predicted that decisive actualisers would provide the most how-related 
information, followed by conditional actualisers, and bluffers, who would provide the least. No 
differences were expected with respect to the amount of why-related information disclosed. 
Furthermore, the point of the interview at which participants provided the most information 
was also explored. Did participants reveal more information in response to information-seeking 
questions (earlier in the interview) or in response to challenging questions (later in the 
interview)? The manuscript of Study I was published in the Journal of Threat Assessment and 
Management (see Appendix E). 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and eighty one students (128 women, 53 men; Mage = 28.31 years, SD = 
10.05 years) at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden) participated in the study. Participants 
were recruited via the university participant pool. This pool consists of both students and non-
students who have signed up for participation in psychological research. Participants were 
approached via email and asked to take part in a study on campaigning strategies used by Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO). They received a cinema ticket for participation (worth 
approximately €11). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental 
conditions: bluffers, conditional actualisers and decisive actualisers. Seven persons felt 
uncomfortable making a threat and withdrew from the study. Seventeen participants did not 
correctly follow the instruction to act or not to act on their threat. Eleven of these had 
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misunderstood or forgotten this part of the instruction, and six did not believe that they were 
truly supposed to follow through with the threat. Their data were excluded from further 
analysis. A total of 157 participants thus remained: 54 bluffers, 51 conditional actualisers and, 
52 decisive actualisers (108 women, 49 men; Mage = 28.10 years, SD = 9.67 years).    
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. The same case was presented to all participants. 
It reflected a moral conflict between a fictive Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) named 
Aweare and a fictive clothing company named Vera. Participants read how Aweare was 
dedicated to improving working conditions in low-wage countries and how Vera was known 
as being socially engaged in the local communities in the countries to which they outsource 
their production. Vera had recently released a commercial in which they drew attention to 
violence against women. Meanwhile, Aweare got hold of video recordings showing how Vera 
exploited women in factories in Cambodia. Aweare considered it to be hypocritical for Vera to 
raise public awareness about violence against women while simultaneously exploiting them 
for their own profit. Aweare therefore decided to take action against Vera. Participants were 
instructed to imagine being part of Aweare and to represent Aweare in this action.  
All participants were instructed to call a representative of Vera and to threaten that they 
would leak the video recordings with evidence of Vera’s malpractice to a Swedish television 
programme for investigative journalism, if the company would not withdraw their commercial 
from television. Participants were either instructed not to leak the recordings (bluffers), to leak 
the recordings only if the company would not agree to withdraw their commercial (conditional 
actualisers) or to leak the recordings no matter how the company would respond to their threat 
(decisive actualisers). All participants were left alone for 15 minutes to prepare for their task(s) 
and all had access to the same background materials. These materials included both ‘why’ 
related information (e.g. visions of Aweare, working conditions in Cambodia) and ‘how’ 
related information (e.g. delivery location for the recordings, name of the media contact). 
Participants were allowed to make notes and to have those with them while talking to Vera. 
Next, the participants called the representative of Vera. They were led to believe that 
the person on the other end of the phone was another participant instructed to play the role as 
the representative. In reality, however, the recipient of the call was a confederate, who 
responded to the threats exactly the same for each participant, using four different 
questions/prompts:  
 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 25 
Q1. Hello, this is Caroline. I’m the head of Public Relations at Vera and I expected 
your call. You initiated this conversation, so please go ahead. 
Q2: I’m not sure I fully understand what you mean; can you please give me more 
information?  
Q3: How do I know that what you are telling me is true?  
Q4: Is there anything else I should know about before ending the conversation?  
Okay, let me think about this. Thank you for your input. Bye.  
 
After the conversation, the experimenter informed the participants that the Vera 
representative thought they were bluffing and therefore decided to ignore the threat. They were 
then instructed to proceed with their task according to the instructions. Bluffers were supposed 
to do nothing, whereas both conditional and decisive actualisers were supposed to provide their 
media contact with a USB stick containing the video recordings. They were intercepted 
immediately after starting the implementation (e.g. put on their coat, walked towards the door). 
 Before the participants made the call, they rated nine statements on their involvement 
with the case (e.g. “I consider women rights and poverty reduction to be two of the most 
important priorities for NGO’s to focus on”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and 
their motivation to perform their task (e.g. “I want Vera to believe that my threat is real”; 1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) using Likert scales. After the call and the interception, 
the participants rated the clarity of the instructions (“How easy/difficult did you find the 
instructions?”; 1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), their satisfaction with the preparation time (1 
= not at all sufficient, 7 = very sufficient), the amount of preparation time spent on preparing 
for the call (1 = no time at all, 5 = all the time), the amount of preparation time spent on 
preparing for the delivery (1 = no time at all, 5 = all the time) and the credibility of the set up 
(e.g. “To what extent did you believe that you would deliver the USB stick to a contact person”; 
1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Participants were then thoroughly debriefed, thanked and 
paid for their participation.  
 
Codings and data preparation 
All calls were transcribed verbatim and coding was conducted on these transcriptions. 
Two coders, blind to the conditions and the hypotheses, first identified ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
information in the background materials that participants had access to while preparing for the 
call. The coders relied on Liberman and Trope’s (1998) distinction between desirability (why) 
and feasibility (how). All information that related to the operations of Vera, the operations of 
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Aweare, the released commercial, and human rights in general was identified as ‘why’ 
information. All information that related to the video recordings, the delivery procedure, the 
delivery location, and the possibilities to successfully implement the threat via investigative 
journalism or Aweare, was identified as ‘how’ information. In total, 44 pieces of ‘why’ 
information and 32 pieces of ‘how’ information were identified in the background materials. 
Each transcript was then coded for the amount of unique pieces of ‘how’ information (range: 
32) and ‘why’ information (range: 44). Each piece of information was counted only the first 
time it was mentioned by the participant and repetitions were thus not taken into account. To 
assess the interrater reliability, one coder coded all the transcripts and the other coder coded 
20% of the transcripts. The interrater agreement was 90 % (Cohen’s κ = .71).  
To explore at which point in time during the interview participants disclosed their 
information, a new dependent measure was computed for ‘how’ and ‘why’ information, 
respectively, using the following equation:  
 
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =  𝑛𝑛1(1) + 𝑛𝑛2(2) + 𝑛𝑛3(3) + 𝑛𝑛4(4) 𝑁𝑁  
 
Where Tav =  the average time (within the interval ranging from Question 1 to 4) when the 
information was reported, ni = the number of pieces of information revealed at the ith question, 
and N = the total number of pieces of information revealed across all four questions. The 
measure could thus range from 1 (all information revealed at Q1) to 4 (all information revealed 
at Q4). 
 
Results 
Self-ratings 
Self-ratings on 7-point Likert scales showed that the participants believed in the setup 
(M = 4.96, SD = 1.07), were involved with the case (M = 5.59, SD = 0.77), and were highly 
motivated to make a convincing threat (M = 6.25, SD = 0.92). Moreover, they did not find it 
overly difficult to comply with the instructions (M = 4.99, SD = 1.47), experienced sufficient 
time to prepare for their tasks (M = 4.53, SD = 1.72), which they had largely spent preparing 
for the threat call (M = 4.26, SD = 0.79, rated on a 5-point scale). Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) revealed no significant differences between conditions on the above measures. The 
only pre-threat measure that showed differences between the conditions was the reported time 
spent on preparing for the delivery of the USB stick, F(2, 146) = 16.52, p <.001, ƞ² = .18. A 
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post hoc test, using Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels, revealed that bluffers reported 
significantly less preparation time spent on the delivery (M = 1.20, SD = 0.06) than both the 
conditional actualisers (M = 1.98, SD = 0.14, p < .001) and the decisive actualisers (M = 2.02, 
SD = 0.13, p < .001). This finding can be seen as an additional manipulation check, as bluffers 
were not supposed to deliver the USB stick. When participants were asked in the debriefing to 
express their thoughts about the study, many spontaneously mentioned that they were nervous 
to make the call (48%), that the task was demanding (34%), and that the set-up felt real (26%).  
  
Hypothesis testing 
The distributions of both ‘how’ and ‘why’ scores were negatively skewed (skewnesshow 
= 0.70, SE = 0.19; skewnesswhy = 1.63, SE = 0.19) and leptokurtic (kurtosishow = 0.64, SE = 
0.39; kurtosiswhy = 5.53, SE = 0.39). Hence, we conducted non-parametric analyses to test our 
hypothesis. The descriptive statistics for each of the experimental groups are reported in Table 
2 (top panel).  
To test for the predicted trend across conditions, individual scores where ranked and 
analyzed using the Jonckheere test (Jonckheere, 1954). A significant trend in the ‘how’ data 
was found. However, the conditions were ranked in the opposite direction to that predicted. 
The highest group median was found for bluffers, followed by conditional actualisers and 
decisive actualisers, J = 3300, z = -2.61, p = .009, r = -.21. In other words, the group that was 
least likely to actualise the threat (bluffers), was found to provide the most ‘how’ information. 
Follow-up analysis, using Mann-Whitney tests with a Bonferroni correction, showed that 
bluffers provided significantly more ‘how’ information during the threat call than did decisive 
actualisers, U = 971, z = -2.75, p = .006, r = - .27. No significant difference was found between 
bluffers and conditional actualisers (U = 1162, z = -1.38, p = .167, r = -.13) or between decisive 
and conditional actualisers (U = 1166.5, z = -1.06, p = .290, r = -.10). With regard to the amount 
of ‘why’ information provided during the threat calls, no significant difference between 
conditions was found using the Kruskal-Wallis test, X²(2, N = 157) = 0.56, p = .76, ƞ² = .00. 
 
Exploratory analyses 
 To examine the point in time during the interview at which participants disclosed their 
information, we conducted a Kruskal-Wallis analysis on the average timing of information 
disclosure. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 (bottom panel). The analysis revealed 
that the timing of disclosure of ‘how’ information differed between the conditions, X²(2, N = 
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157) = 8.85, p = .012, ƞ² = .06. Pairwise Mann-Whitney comparisons, using Bonferroni-
corrected alpha levels, revealed that bluffers disclosed ‘how’ information significantly later in 
the interview than did decisive actualisers, U = 944.5, z = -2.91, p = .004, r = - .28. No 
significant differences were found between bluffers and conditional actualisers (U = 1127, z = 
-1.60, p = .109, r = - .15) and between conditional and decisive actualisers (U = 1104, z = -
1.47, p = .143, r = -.15). A similar pattern was observed for the timing of ‘why’ information. 
The point in time during the interview at which participants disclosed ‘why’ information 
differed between conditions, X²(2, N = 157) = 11.58, p = .003, ƞ² = .07. Bluffers disclosed 
‘why’ information significant later in the interview than did conditional actualisers (U = 917, 
z = -2.95, p = .003, r = -.29) and decisive actualisers (U = 943.5, z = -2.91, p = .004, r = -.28). 
No significant difference was found between conditional and decisive actualisers (U = 1346, z 
= .13, p = .895, r = .01).  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Amount (Top Panel) and Timing (Bottom Panel) of ‘Why’ and 
‘How’ Information Revealed by Bluffers, Conditional Actualisers, and Decisive Actualisers.  
Condition 
Why 
 
How 
M (SD) 95% CI Mdn M (SD) 95% CI Mdn  
 Amount 
 
Bluffers 
Conditional 
Decisive 
 
8.31 (3.29) 
8.18 (3.74) 
8.35 (4.86) 
 
[7.42, 9.21] 
[7.13, 9.23] 
[6.99, 9.70] 
 
8.00  
8.00 
7.00 
  
8.80 (3.18) 
8.35 (4.07) 
7.25 (3.17) 
 
[7.93, 9.66] 
[7.21, 9.50] 
[6.37, 8.13] 
 
9.00 
7.00 
7.00 
 Time 
 
Bluffers 
Conditional 
Decisive 
 
1.81 (0.40) 
 
1.58 (0.45) 
 
1.58 (0.42) 
 
[1.70, 1.92] 
 
[1.46, 1.71] 
 
[1.46, 1.70] 
 
1.80 
 
1.50 
 
1.50 
  
2.40 (0.78) 
 
2.17 (0.74) 
 
1.98 (0.76) 
 
[2.19, 2.62] 
 
[1.97, 2.38] 
 
[1.77, 2.19] 
 
2.33 
 
2.10 
 
1.85 
Note. The time variables correspond to the average point in time during the interview at which 
the information was revealed (1 = all information revealed at Question 1, 4 = all information 
revealed at Question 4). 
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All interviews started with two information-seeking questions/prompts (Q1: “Please go 
ahead” and Q2: “Can you please give me more information”), followed by two challenging 
question (Q3: “How do I know that what you are telling me is true?” and Q4: “Is there anything 
else I should know about before ending the conversation?”). The patterns of change in 
responses from the information-seeking phase (Q1 and Q2) to the challenging phase (Q3 and 
Q4) differed significantly between the experimental conditions. More specifically, 44% of the 
bluffers revealed more ‘how’ information in the challenging phase than in the information-
seeking phase, compared with 23% of the conditional actualisers, and 17% of the decisive 
actualisers, X²(2, N = 157) = 9.67, p = .008, ƞ² = .06. Again, pairwise comparisons only revealed 
significant differences between bluffers and decisive actualisers (p = .007, r = .30). No 
difference was found with respect to ‘why’ information. Participants in all conditions showed 
similar patterns of change in their ‘why’ response. Only 2% of the bluffers, 2% of the 
conditional actualisers, and 2% of the decisive actualisers revealed more ‘why’ information in 
the challenging phase than in the information-seeking phase, X²(2, N = 157) = 0.35, p = .839, 
ƞ² = .00. 
 
Gender 
 Female participants (M = 5.70, SD = 0.61) reported a significantly higher involvement 
with the case, compared to male participants (M = 5.33, SD = 0.99), t (155) = 2.916, p = .004, 
d = .44, 95% CI [.09, .78]. However, no significant Gender × Condition interactions were found 
for the amount and timing of how-information provided and for the amount and timing of why 
information provided (all p’s > .279). This means that the manipulation of the study (i.e., 
random assignment of participants as bluffers, conditional actualisers, or decisive actualisers) 
affected male and female participants similarly.  
 
Discussion 
 Contrary to the hypothesis, participants who were least likely to actualise the threat 
(bluffers) provided the most detail on how the threat would be implemented. This finding 
became particularly pronounced when participants were challenged in the latter half of the 
interview, that is, when they were questioned critically (“How do I know what you are telling 
me is true?”) or given a last opportunity to talk (“Is there anything else I should know about 
before ending this conversation?”). The groups did not differ in terms of the disclosure of why-
related information. Overall, bluffers revealed more information during the latter half of the 
interview as compared with decisive actualisers.  
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These results contradict previous studies which suggest detailed accounts of planning 
and implementation are associated with true intent (Mac Giolla et al., 2013; Sooniste et al., 
2014) and the risk that threats will be actualised (Calhoun & Weston, 2003). Furthermore, the 
results conflict with the notion that events likely to happen in the near future are construed and 
described in more concrete, how-related terms (Wakslak et al., 2006). A potential explanation 
may be that actualisers, more often than bluffers, choose to keep how-related details to 
themselves to ensure successful implementation. This explanation suggests that threat 
statements reflect strategic concerns about what is best to reveal rather than what is possible to 
reveal. Differently put, threateners must strike a balance between what information to reveal 
and what information to conceal. Threat managers may benefit from learning more about such 
information-management strategies. 
A few limitations should be mentioned. First, the verbal behaviours of bluffers and 
decisive actualisers did not differ significantly from that of conditional actualisers. This might 
have been due to the manipulation. The likelihood to actualize the threat (deliver USB stick) 
was manipulated between conditions. However, the likelihood to make the threat was the same 
for all three conditions (all participants had to make the phone call). Because participants were 
generally nervous for making the call and spent most of the preparation time preparing for this, 
less thoughts and effort might have gone to the actual manipulation (i.e., delivering the USB 
stick or not). If this was the case, the conditions did not differ too much from each other and 
the study failed to manipulate the participants’ construals and subsequent behaviours. Second, 
the generalizability of the current findings might be limited by the overrepresentation of 
females in the tested sample and by limited personal involvement of the participants in the 
threats they made. Although participants in the current study reported that they felt involved in 
the case, that they were motivated to perform well, and that they experienced participation as 
real and demanding, an experimental setting obviously differs from the more complex 
circumstances in which threatening behaviour commonly occurs (e.g., grievance, hostile world 
views, mental illness; Warren et al., 2013). 
 
Study II 
 
The second study elaborated on the idea that emerged in Study I. That is, in order to 
elicit valuable information from threateners, it is important to learn about the strategies they 
employ when being questioned about their intentions (i.e. counter-interview strategies). 
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Understanding the counter-interview strategies of interviewees has proven to be of great value 
in related settings such as suspect interviewing and human intelligence gathering (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2015; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, 2014). In Study II, it was 
explored whether threatening participants used counter-interview strategies or not, whether 
they changed strategies during the interview or not, and why they changed strategies (for those 
who did). Additionally, it was theorised that the need to be believed is more urgent for bluffers 
than for actualisers as bluffers are entirely dependent on a target’s willingness to meet their 
demands. Based on this assumption, it was predicted that bluffers (in comparison to actualisers) 
would be more forthcoming when asked specific questions (Hypothesis 1), would perceive 
more suspicion towards them when interviewed with a suspicion-oriented interview protocol 
(Hypothesis 2), and would provide more information when interviewed with a suspicion-
oriented interview protocol (Hypothesis 3). Finally, it was theorised that actualisers would 
experience a need to secure successful implementation of a threat. Hence, it was predicted that 
actualisers would be more reluctant to share implementation details than bluffers (i.e. how-
related information; Hypothesis 4). The manuscript of Study II was published in the Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition (see Appendix F). 
 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 195 participants, mainly undergraduate university students at the University 
of Gothenburg (Sweden), took part in the study (134 women, 46 men, 15 missing; Mage = 26.60 
years, SD = 7.38 years) in which they made a threat via a phone call. They participated on a 
voluntary basis and received a movie ticket worth approximately €12 in return. Fifteen 
participants did not make the call because they (a) felt uncomfortable doing so (n = 13), (b) 
had participated in a similar study before (n = 1), or (c) due to a technical failure (n = 1). Their 
data were excluded from further analysis. Hence, a sample of 179 participants remained (130 
women, 46 men, 3 other; Mage = 26.60 years, SD = 7.35 years). Participants were randomly 
assigned as bluffers (n = 90) or actualisers (n = 89). Furthermore, a random half of the bluffers 
and actualisers were assigned to be questioned with the high-suspicion protocol (n = 91), and 
the other half were assigned to be questioned with the low-suspicion protocol (n = 88).  
 
Procedure 
  The procedure largely resembled the threat paradigm developed for Study I. 
Participants were presented with a case that reflected a moral conflict between a fictive Non-
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Governmental Organisation (NGO) named Aweare and a fictive clothing company named 
Vera. Participants read how Aweare was dedicated to improving working conditions in low-
wage countries and how Vera was known as being socially engaged in the local communities 
in the countries where Vera outsourced their production. Vera had recently released a 
commercial in which they drew attention to violence against women. Meanwhile, Aweare got 
hold of video recordings showing how Vera exploited women in factories in Cambodia. 
Aweare considered it hypocritical for Vera to raise public awareness about violence against 
women while simultaneously exploiting them for their own profit. Aweare therefore decided 
to take action against Vera. Participants were instructed to imagine being part of Aweare and 
to represent Aweare in this action.  
All participants were instructed to call a representative of Vera.  They were instructed 
to threaten to leak the video recordings containing evidence of Vera’s malpractice to the media, 
unless the company withdrew their commercial from television. Participants were either 
instructed to bluff when making this claim and thus not truly leak the recordings (bluffers), or 
to do as they claimed and leak the recordings right after the call, regardless of the outcome of 
the call (actualisers). All participants were given 15 minutes to prepare for their task(s) and all 
had access to the same background materials (e.g. information about Aweare, working 
conditions in Cambodia, route to the delivery location for the recordings). Participants were 
allowed to make notes and to have those with them while talking to Vera. 
Next, the participants phoned the representative of Vera. The recipient of the call was a 
confederate who responded to the threats according to structured interview protocols, displayed 
in Table 3. Each participant was initially invited to speak freely (free-statement phase) and was 
then questioned about the threat he or she made (specific-questions phase). Half of the 
participants were asked high-suspicion questions/prompts, suggesting that the interviewer 
aimed to assess the truthfulness of the threat (high-suspicion protocol; e.g. “How do I know 
that what you are saying is true?”). The other half were asked low-suspicion questions/prompts, 
suggesting that the interviewer aimed to better understand the threat (low-suspicion protocol; 
e.g. “To make sure that I get you right, I need to know more”).  
After the call, the experimenter informed all participants that the Vera representative 
thought they were bluffing and therefore decided to ignore the threat. They were then instructed 
to proceed with their task according to the instructions. Bluffers were supposed to do nothing, 
whereas actualisers were supposed to provide their media contact with a USB stick containing 
the video recordings. They were intercepted immediately after starting the implementation (e.g. 
when walking towards the door). 
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 Each participant was then asked to answer closed and open-ended questions about the 
strategies they had used in their communication with Vera. They were asked whether or not 
they had used any particular strategy (if so, to describe this strategy) and whether they had 
changed their strategy during the call (if so, to explain why). Next, each participant completed 
the perceived suspicion scale by rating three items; "Vera believed me", "Vera trusted me”, 
and "Vera was suspicious of me" (1 = not at all; 7 = very much; Buller, Strzyzewski, & 
Comstock, 1991; α = .68). To compute an overall measure of perceived suspicion, the average 
score on the three items was calculated after reversing two on the three items (belief, trust) so 
that a higher score on the items reflected a higher level of perceived suspicion. Each participant 
further rated nine statements related to their involvement in the case (e.g. “It is important that 
action is taken against Vera”; α = .74), their belief in the authenticity of the case, how difficult 
they had found the instructions and their task, how nervous they had been for their task, how 
sufficient the time for preparation had been, and how willing they had been to give Vera 
information. 
 
Table 3 
Interview Protocols That Were Used to Answer the Participants’ Threat Calls 
Free-statement phase 
 
Hello, my name is Caroline. I’m the head of public relations at Vera’s and I expected your call. 
You initiated this conversation, so please go ahead. 
 
Specific-questions phase 
 Low-suspicion protocol  High-suspicion protocol  
 
The reason that I take this call is because it is my 
responsibility to understand you correctly. Therefore I 
would like to ask you to provide me with more 
information.  
 
Thank you. But this is not yet enough for me to draw 
the entire picture. To complete my task and make sure 
that I get you right, I need to know more.  
 
Before we finish this conversation, is there anything 
else that I should know of?  
 
The reason that I take this call is because it is my 
responsibility to find out whether or not you are 
telling the truth. Therefore I would like to ask you to 
provide me with more information. 
 
Thank you. But this is not yet enough for me to make 
a proper judgement. How do I know that what you are 
saying is true? 
 
Before we finish this conversation, is there anything 
else that could further convince me? 
Note: Italics indicate words that differed between the interview protocols. 
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All scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Participants were then thoroughly 
debriefed, thanked for their participation, and handed the movie ticket as reward for 
participation. 
 
Coding  
Provided information. Two trained coders coded the transcribed calls. Each transcript 
was coded for (a) the total amount of information revealed, which was further broken down 
into the amount of (b) ‘why’ and (c) ‘how’ information, reflecting Vallacher and Wegner’s 
(1987) distinction between ‘why’ aspects (why to threaten) and ‘how’ aspects of an action (how 
to enact the threat). The same coding scheme as in Study I was used. The scheme included 76 
pieces of information in the background materials to which the participants had access while 
preparing for the call. Of this total, 44 pieces were classified are ‘why’ information, and 32 
pieces were classified as ‘how’ information. For instance, explanations about the poor 
conditions in Cambodia, the malpractice of Vera, or the vision of Aweare were classified as 
‘why’ information. Moreover, details such as the delivery location or the name of the media 
contact were classified as ‘how’ information. Each transcript was coded for new pieces of 
information. A piece of information was considered new when it was mentioned for the first 
time by the participant. Repetitions were thus not taken into account. Two coders coded 20% 
of the transcripts, resulting in agreement on 92% of the decisions made (Cohen’s κ = .77). One 
of the coders completed the remaining 80% of the transcripts. The coders were blind to the 
condition of the participants and the hypotheses of the study. 
 
Reported strategies. Two coders coded the answers provided for the strategy question 
(i.e. “Describe the strategy you used during your communication with Vera”). Reported 
strategies were divided into two categories, mirroring the previously described ‘how’ versus 
‘why’ division. Strategies focused on the implementation of the threat were classified as ‘how’ 
strategies (e.g. “My strategy was to convince Vera that I really had the material, and that giving 
it to my contact would be problematic for them”). Strategies focused on motivating the threat 
were classified as ‘why’ strategies (e.g. “I tried to make Vera realise that their business 
operation is hypocritical”). When participants reported both type of strategies, only the main 
strategy was coded (e.g. the following statement was coded as a ‘how’ strategy, “My strategy 
was to show my power by stressing that I had the USB stick in my hand. I also tried to be 
informative”). When both types of strategies were equally prevalent, it was coded as “both” 
(e.g. “I tried to make clear that their vision went against the actual working conditions. I pointed 
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out that I had proof and was ready to reveal the proof to the public”). Strategies that fitted 
neither one of the two categories were classified as “other”. After the coders coded 20% of the 
answers and reached an interrater agreement of 86% (Cohen’s κ = .70), one coder proceeded 
with the remaining material. Again, the coders were unaware of the conditions and hypotheses.  
 
Change of strategies. The open-ended question on strategy change (i.e. “Explain why 
you changed strategy during the communication with Vera”) was included for exploratory 
purposes. Hence, a data-driven scheme was used to code the participants’ answers, meaning 
that one individual, blind to the conditions, used the answers to identify broader categories in 
the data. Four reasons for strategy change were identified: (1) The participant did not get the 
response that they had wanted/expected, (2) the participant was asked to provide more 
information, (3) the participant was asked to prove their point, and/or (4) the conversation was 
coming to an end. It was possible for participants to report more than one reason. Reasons that 
fitted neither one of the four mentioned categories were classified as ‘other’. Two individuals 
coded 20% of the material. After calculating the interrater agreement (93%, Cohen’s κ = .73), 
one coder completed the remaining material.  
To reiterate, the experimental design involved suspects making a threatening phone call 
to a company. The threat was about leaking a video containing evidence of malpractice. The 
phone call included two sections; a free report section initiated by the threatener, followed by 
a series of prompts initiated by the company. Manipulations were made with respect to the 
instructions to the threateners (“bluff about the threat” vs. “actualise the threat”) and with 
respect to the level of suspicion raised by the company in the prompts (high vs. low). The 
dependent variables were i) the amount of (‘how’ and ‘why’) information provided in each 
section of the threat statement, ii) the self-reported strategies used to present the case, and iii) 
the self-reported reasons for strategy change. 
 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
  The descriptive statistics of the participants’ self-ratings are displayed in Table 4. The 
table reveals that participants assessed the case as authentic, rated high involvement with 
Aweare’s case against Vera, understood the instructions, and reported that they had sufficient 
time to prepare for their tasks. Yet, participants found their tasks demanding and were nervous 
about completing them. This was true for both making the threat call and for delivering the 
USB stick (the latter was rated by actualisers only). Independent t-tests showed that none of  
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Table 4 
Mean Values (and Standard Deviations) of Bluffers’ and Actualisers’ Involvement with the 
Case, Experienced Difficulty to Comply with the Instructions, and Nervousness about 
Performing the Tasks 
 
Rating  
 
Bluffer 
 
Actualiser 
 
Involvement with case  
 
5.52 (0.77) 
 
5.66 (0.77) 
Belief that case rested on authentic facts 5.69 (1.36) 5.94 (1.04) 
Understanding of instructions 5.92 (1.03) 5.89 (1.12) 
Sufficiency of preparation time  4.81 (1.79) 4.31 (1.80) 
Difficulty making call 4.82 (1.51) 4.67 (1.75) 
Difficulty preparing delivery  N/A 2.86 (1.62) 
Nervousness about making call 5.13 (1.65) 5.28 (1.69) 
Nervousness about delivering  N/A 2.94 (1.87) 
Note: There were no significant differences between bluffers and actualisers on the reported 
ratings (p > .05). All ratings were made on 7-point Likert scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
 
these measures differed significantly between actualisers and bluffers, all t’s (177) < 1.81, p’s 
> .07. 
 Actualisers and bluffers were supposed to have different intentions with regard to 
delivering the USB stick. Actualisers were supposed to deliver the stick immediately after 
making the threat call, whereas bluffers were not. To check if all participants acted accordingly, 
the experimenter waited for the participants to initiate or not initiate the first move towards 
delivery (e.g. walking towards the door). All actualisers started the implementation, whereas 
none of the bluffers did. Hence, the manipulation of intent was considered successful. 
 
Perceived suspicion 
A 2 (Threat: bluff vs. actualise) × 2 (Protocol: high suspicion vs. low suspicion) 
between-subjects ANOVA on the level of perceived suspicion, revealed a main effect of 
protocol, F(1, 175) = 11.53, p = .001, ƞp² = .06. The participants who were questioned with the 
high-suspicion protocol reported to have experienced more suspicion directed towards them 
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 (M = 5.44, SD = 1.00) than the participants questioned with the low-suspicion protocol (M = 
4.93, SD = 1.03), which supports the effectiveness of the protocols. Note that both protocols 
induced suspicion awareness, and the low-suspicion protocol thus refers to lower (rather than 
low) suspicion induction compared to the high-suspicion protocol. Furthermore, there was no 
main effect of threat, F(1, 175) = 2.90, p = .090, ƞp² = .02. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, no 
significant interaction was found between Threat and Protocol, F(1, 175) = 0.83, p = .364, ƞp² 
= .01. Bluffers and actualisers experienced similar levels of suspicion in the low-suspicion 
protocol (Mbluff  = 4.73, SD  = 1.00; Mactualise  = 5.13, SD = 1.03), as well as in the high-suspicion 
protocol (Mbluff  = 5.38, SD  = 1.07; Mactualise  = 5.50, SD = 0.92). Thus, the highly suspicious 
questions affected bluffers’ and actualisers’ perceived suspicion to the same extent.  
 
Provided information 
It was found that all participants were fairly forthcoming in the free-statement phase. 
About half of the total amount of information given by bluffers and actualisers was provided 
during the free-statement phase (bluffers 47%, actualisers 54%). This finding was further 
supported by the participants’ self-rated willingness to share information, showing that both 
bluffers (M = 5.02, SD = 1.57) and actualisers (M = 5.40, SD = 1.39) were rather willing to 
share information, t(177) = -1.72, p = .086, d = .26, 95% CI [-.551, .038]. The willingness 
rating was significantly related to the actual amount of information provided in the interview, 
r = .20, 95% CI [.059, .353], p = .008.  
 To test the hypotheses with regard to information provision (H1, H3, and H4), three 
separate ANOVA’s were conducted. The descriptive statistics of all three analyses are 
displayed in Table 5. First, a 2 (Threat: bluff vs. actualise) × 2 (Phase: free-statement vs. 
specific-questions) mixed ANOVA was performed on the total amount of details provided in 
the statements, with Threat as the between-subjects factor, and Phase as the within-subjects 
factor. The analysis revealed no main effects of Threat, F(1, 177) = 0.66, p = .419, ƞp² = .00, 
or Phase, F(1, 177) = 0.00, p = .983, ƞp² = .00. However, there was a significant Threat × Phase 
interaction effect, F(1, 177) = 4.19, p = .042, ƞp² = .02. Tests of simple effects provided support 
for Hypothesis 1. As can be seen in Figure 1a, bluffers provided more information in the 
specific-question phase than actualisers did, F(1, 177) = 4.74, p = .031, ƞp² = .03, whereas no 
such difference was found for the free-statement phase, F(1, 177) = 1.58, p = .211, ƞp² = .01. 
 Second, to test the influence of suspicion, a 2 (Threat: bluff vs. actualise) × 2 (Protocol: 
high suspicion vs. low suspicion) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the information 
provided in the specific-question phase. Already reported, bluffers provided more information 
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Table 5  
Mean values (and Standard Deviations) for the Amount of Information that Bluffers and 
Actualiser Provided in their Threat Statements by Phase, Protocol, and Information 
 
in the specific-question phase compared to actualisers, hence a significant main effect of Threat 
was found, F(1, 175) = 4.89, p = .028, ƞp² = .03. There was no main effect for Protocol, F(1, 
175) = 4.89, p = .028, ƞp² = .03. Importantly, no support was found for Hypothesis 3. The mean 
values even suggest an opposite trend. That is, bluffers provided more information than 
actualisers when questioned under low suspicion (rather than under high suspicion), but this 
Threat × Protocol interaction was not found statistically significant, F(1, 175) = 2.85, p = .093, 
ƞp² = .02. 
Third, a 2 (Threat: bluff vs. actualise) × 2 (Information: how vs. why) mixed ANOVA 
was performed to examine the type of information provided by bluffers and actualisers. No 
main effect of Threat was found, F(1, 177) = 0.66, p = .419, ƞp² = .00. However, the analysis 
revealed a main effect of Information F(1, 177) = 5.86, p = .017, ƞp² = .03, showing that 
participants revealed more ‘how’ than ‘why’ information. There was a significant Threat × 
Information interaction, F(1, 177) = 5.06, p = .026, ƞp² = .03. In support of Hypothesis 4, simple 
effect tests revealed that bluffers provided significantly more ‘how’ details throughout their  
 Free-statement phase  Specific-questions phase 
Threat  M (SD) M (SD) 
Bluffer 7.97 (4.52)  9.17 (4.60)a 
Actualiser 8.87 (5.04)  7.64 (4.78) 
 Low-suspicion protocol  High-suspicion protocol 
Threat  M (SD) M (SD) 
Bluffer 9.84 (4.78)  8.52 (4.37) 
Actualiser 7.11 (4.93)  8.16 (4.62) 
 ‘How’ information  ‘Why’ information 
Threat  M (SD) M (SD) 
Bluffer 9.33 (3.56)  7.80 (3.53) 
Actualiser 8.28 (3.33)  8.22 (3.13) 
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Note. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals 
 
statement than did actualisers, F(1, 177) = 4.14, p = .043, ƞp² = .02, whereas no significant 
difference between the groups was found for the amount of ‘why’ details provided,  F(1, 177) 
= 0.73, p = .396, ƞp²  = .00.  This effect is displayed in Figure 1b. 
 
Strategies 
Nearly all participants reported to have used some strategy when communicating the 
threat (94%). The vast majority of the reported strategies (78%) could be classified as a ‘how’ 
(35%), ‘why’ (35%) or ‘both’ (8%). Chi-square analyses revealed that bluffers and actualisers 
reported to have used ‘how’ and ‘why’ strategies to an equal extent (see Table 6). Hence, the 
findings on reported strategies lend no further support to Hypothesis 4. Further, participants 
were asked if they changed their strategies during the conversation, and if so, why they changed 
strategy. Out of 164 participants who reported to have had a strategy, 82 (50%) reported to have 
changed strategy during the conversation. Participants reported to have changed strategy (a)  
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Figure 1a. Total amount of information provided 
by bluffers and actualisers in the free-statement 
phase and in the specific-questions phase. 
Figure 1b. Amount of ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
information provided by bluffers and 
actualisers. 
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Table 6 
Reported Strategies by Bluffers and Actualisers 
Strategy  Bluffers Actualisers X2 p φ 
Why (focus on explaining the threat) 29 (32%) 33 (37%) 0.47 .495 .05 
How (focus on implementing the threat) 32 (36%) 31 (35%) 0.01 .919 .01 
Both (’how’/’why’ to an equal extent) 5 (6%) 9 (10%) 1.29 .256 .08 
Other 16 (18%) 13 (15%) 0.33 .565 .04 
No strategy 8 (9%) 3 (3%) 2.36 .124 .11 
 
 
because the response from Vera differed from what they had wanted/expected (42%; e.g. 
“When I noticed a lack of moral response, I tried to instill fear”), (b) because they were asked 
to provide more information (29%; e.g. “When I suddenly was asked to clarify my point, I tried 
to explain how they violate human rights”), (c) because they were asked to prove their point 
(17%; e.g. “When Vera wanted me to show that I was telling the truth, I tried to rethink and 
express myself differently”), (d) because the end of the conversation was approaching (10%; 
e.g. “Towards the end, when Vera did not sound convinced, I tried to push more towards the 
fact that it was in their own interest”), and/or (e) for other reasons (6%; e.g. “I lost what I was 
going to say and strayed away from my strategy”). Seven participants (9%) did not report the 
reason for their change of strategy. Chi-square analysis revealed no significant differences 
between bluffers and actualisers for the number of strategy changes or for the type of reasons 
reported (X2 < 3.84). 
An explorative analysis was conducted to examine the influence of suspicion on the 
number of strategy changes reported. A chi-square analysis showed that a comparable 
percentage of participants interviewed under low suspicion (43.4%) and high suspicion (56.8%) 
made strategy changes, X2 (1, N = 164) = 2.95, p = .086, φ =.13.  
In addition, the relationship between strategy change and information provision was 
further explored in a mixed Change (yes vs. no) × Phase (free-statement vs. specific-questions) 
ANOVA on the amount of information provided. Note that only the participants who reported 
to have used a strategy were included in the analysis (n = 164). The analysis yielded a near-
significant Change × Phase interaction, F(1, 162) = 3.64, p = .058, ƞp² = .02. The trend in the 
data points out that participants who reported a shift in strategy, increased their information 
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provision from the free-statement phase (M = 7.96, SD = 4.91) to the specific-question phase 
(M = 8.96, SD = 4.99), whereas participants who reported no shift in strategy decreased their 
information provision from the free-statement phase (M = 8.93, SD = 4.67) to the specific-
question phase (M = 7.54, SD = 4.49).  
Last, the correlation was tested between type of strategies reported (how vs. why) and 
type of information provided (how vs why). A positive correlation was found between the 
reported use of ‘why’ strategies and the amount of ‘why’ information provided, rpb = .338, p < 
.001. No correlation was found between the reported use of ‘how’ strategies and the provision 
of ‘how’ information, rpb = .072, p = .422.  
 
Gender 
 Female participants (M = 5.67, SD = 0.73) reported a significantly higher involvement 
with the case, compared to male participants (M = 5.34, SD = 0.85), t (174) = 2.527, p = .012, 
d = .50, 95% CI [.16, .84]. Gender differences were also found for the moment of information 
disclosure. Female participants provided significantly more information in the free-statement 
phase (M = 8.84, SD = 4.86) than male participants did (M = 7.17, SD = 4.51), t (174) = 2.038, 
p = .043, d = .35, 95% CI [.01, .69], but male participants provided significantly more 
information in the specific-question phase (M = 9.96, SD = 4.82) than female participants did 
(M = 7.96, SD = 4.62), t (174) = 2.615, p = .010, d = .45, 95% CI [.11, .79]. However, these 
gender differences were not found to interact with the manipulations of the study. Thus, male 
and females responded similarly to the threat-manipulations (bluff vs. actualise) and to the 
interview-manipulation (low vs. high suspicion protocol), all p’s > .309. No gender differences 
were found for the amount of how-information provided (p = .749), the amount of why-
information provided (p = .681), or for the reported use of strategies (p = .292). 
 
Discussion 
Nearly all participants reported to have used a strategy when communicating their 
threats. Strategies focusing on implementation of the threat (how-related strategies) were 
reported as often as strategies focusing on motivation for the threat (why-related strategies). 
Half of all participants who reported to have used a strategy changed strategies during the 
interaction in order to successfully withstand questioning. Bluffers and actualisers did not differ 
in their strategy use. Moreover, participants reported to be fairly willing to share information 
with the interviewer and spontaneously provided about half of the total amount of information 
to which they had access (i.e. in their free-statement). Thus, while participants were found to 
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be forthcoming, they were also strategic and adaptive to the target’s responses. These findings 
suggest that threateners avail of self-regulative mechanisms when being questioned about their 
intent regardless of whether they are bluffing or not—a suggestion that matches theory and 
research on self-presentation which states that both guilty and innocent suspects must regulate 
their behaviour (albeit in different ways) in order to make a credible impression (DePaulo, 
1992; Hartwig et al., 2010).  
The hypotheses were partly confirmed. Actualisers provided fewer details concerning 
the implementation of the threat than did bluffers (supporting H4). This finding replicated the 
results of Study I. Furthermore, bluffers provided more information in response to specific-
questions as compared to actualisers (supporting H1). However, this difference was not 
increased by the use of a suspicion-oriented interview protocol (rejecting H3). The latter result 
is probably best explained by the finding that bluffers and actualisers reported to have 
experienced similar levels of suspicion (rejecting H2). Thus, communicating suspicion in the 
interview had no particular impact on bluffers. The study did not provide a clear explanation 
for this particular finding, yet, the finding differs from research showing that lying interviewees 
(which bluffers can be considered to be) are more sensitive to the risk for not being believed 
(Hartwig et al., 2010; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008).   
With regard to gender, it was found that female (vs. male) participants were more 
involved with the case, and provided more information in their free statement (but 
comparatively less information in response to the interviewer’s questions). One explanation for 
these differences might be that females related more to the content of the case (i.e., violations 
of women rights) compared to males. Importantly, the gender differences were found to exist 
independent of the manipulations in the study. For instance, whether they were bluffing or 
actualising, females were more informative than males in their free statement. Moreover, 
whether they were interviewed under low or high-suspicion, males were more informative than 
females in response to questions. Thus, there existed some gender differences in involvement 
and responsiveness but these differences did not impact the main findings of the study. 
Although the predicted differences between bluffers and actualisers were partly 
confirmed, the current study did not provide a clear insight into the processes explaining these 
differences. Some possible mediators were not explicitly measured (e.g., that actualisers find 
implementation details risky to reveal; that bluffers are more concerned about their credibility), 
and others could not be properly established (e.g., that bluffers perceive more suspicion directed 
towards them; that actualisers intentionally conceal ‘how’ details). A more general shortcoming 
is that the student sample used may speak against the external validity of the study. It can be 
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argued that the average student differs from the average person who poses a threat of violence. 
Finally, the magnitudes of the differences found between bluffers and actualisers were small to 
moderate. Small differences may be valuable on a theoretical level, as these could tell 
something about underlying mechanisms that are at play, but on an operational level it is 
unlikely that small behavioral differences can be detected by professionals who interact with 
subjects of concern.  
 
Study III 
 
 It could be argued that skilled interviewing starts with an understanding of the 
interviewee’s perspective (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Therefore, Study III advanced Study II 
by exploring what types of counter-interview strategies threateners employ. In addition, the 
study examined the efficacy of two interview approaches commonly used in law enforcement 
and intelligence gathering contexts: direct interviewing vs. rapport-based interviewing (Alison, 
et al., 2013; Justice et al., 2010). It was predicted that rapport-based interviewing would be 
more effective for threat assessment and management purposes (Bull, 2013; Meissner et al., 
2014). Specifically, it was predicted that threateners interviewed with the rapport-based 
protocol would use fewer counter-interview strategies (Hypothesis 1), provide more 
information (Hypothesis 2), display a lower willingness to carry out a threat (Hypothesis 3), 
and display a higher willingness to interact (meet) with the conflicting party again (Hypothesis 
4) than threateners interviewed with the direct protocol. The manuscript of Study III was 
submitted for publication to the Journal of Psychology, Crime, and Law (see Appendix G). 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 One hundred and twenty students at the University of Gothenburg (33 men, 83 women, 
4 other, Mage = 27.38 years, SD = 8.83 years) participated in the experiment on a voluntary 
basis. The gender category “other” consisted of participants who categorized themselves as 
neither man nor woman. Participation took approximately 40 minutes and participants were 
compensated with 100 SEK (approx. 11 USD). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two interview conditions: direct interviewing (n = 60) or rapport-based interviewing (n = 60).  
 
Procedure 
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  Participants were recruited for a study on ‘career challenges’. Upon arrival, they read a 
fictitious case about a work conflict between a consultancy company and a former employee. 
The case file revealed how the company had allegedly tricked recent graduates into unpaid 
internships by promising them a permanent position. After the internship, however, their 
contract was ended and the company had profited from free labour. A duped employee wrote a 
letter to the company in which s/he threatened to press charges against this malpractice, unless 
the company would financially compensate her/him for the work carried out. Participants were 
asked to imagine being this employee. See Appendix A for the full background story and the 
instructions to the participants. 
 First, participants were asked to list up to five reasons for why they would press charges 
at this point in time, as well as reasons for why they would not press charges at this point in 
time. This task was meant to stimulate the participants to think carefully about the case before 
they rated four items about their willingness to enact the threat (i.e. to press charges). 
Participants rated the extent to which (i) they believed they could win the case in a court of law, 
(ii) they thought the case was worth pursuing, even if it would be rather expensive, (iii) they 
thought the case was worth pursuing even if it would take time, and (iv) they were likely to 
press charges (1 = not at all, 9 = very much; α = .85). The procedure was repeated for the 
participants’ willingness to interact with the company about their case; participants were first 
asked to list reasons for and against interacting with them at this point in time, and then rated 
the extent to which (i) they would be willing to communicate with the company if the company 
would contact them about their case, (ii) they would seek contact with the company to provide 
the company with information about their case, and (iii) they would seek contact with the 
company to gather information about their case (1 = not at all, 9 = very much; α = .64).  
Next, participants were informed that an employee of the internal security unit from the 
company would discuss the case with them. Participants were then given 10 minutes to prepare 
themselves for this meeting and they received additional information about their case (e.g. an 
overview of the hours they had worked for the company, the contact details of a counsellor). 
Participants were allowed to make notes and to bring those with them to the meeting. 
Furthermore, participants were told to keep in mind that “If you reveal too much, the company 
might take advantage of the information you provide. If you reveal too little, the company might 
not take you seriously”. This was supposed to reflect the information-management dilemma 
that interviewees in the legal arena typically face (Hartwig et al., 2010; Granhag et al., 2016).  
 Immediately after the preparation phase, participants were brought to the meeting room. 
The role of the interviewer was played by one of two confederates (man and woman) who were 
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blind to the hypotheses of the study. The interviewers conducted an equal number of interviews 
across conditions. All participants received the same 11 questions/prompts. The questions 
tapped into topics that are considered to be relevant in threat management (e.g. motivation, 
intentions, capacity; Vossekuil et al., 2015). Half of the participants were approached with a 
direct interview protocol, meaning that the questions/prompts were asked straightforwardly. 
The other half were approached with a rapport-based interview protocol, meaning that the 
questions/prompts were phrased in a rapport-promoting manner. The interview protocols are 
displayed in Appendix B.  
After the interview, participants rated the same seven items as they had rated before the 
interview, about their willingness to enact the threat at this point in time (four items, α = .89), 
and about their willingness to interact with the company in the future (three items, α = .73). In 
addition, the participants were asked to report if they had used a particular strategy when 
interacting with the interviewer (and if so, to describe this strategy). Finally, participants 
reported their age, gender, and current occupation. 
 
Protocol Pretesting 
The interview protocols were pretested in a separate study. A total of 141 participants 
(80 men, 61 women) judged to what extent the interview protocols were rapport-promoting. 
Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and they were each compensated 
0.50 USD. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two interview protocols; the direct 
interview protocol (n = 73) or the rapport-based interview protocol (n = 68). First, participants 
read the fictitious case about the work conflict between the consultancy company and the former 
employee (see Appendix A) so that they would understand the context of the interview 
questions. Next, they listened to the interview questions as if they were the interviewee. Finally, 
participants rated 13 items reflecting elements of rapport (e.g. ‘The interviewer understands the 
difficult situation that I am in’, see for all items Appendix C). The items were rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; α = .83).   
 In support of the design, participants exposed to the rapport-based interview protocol 
reported significantly higher ratings of rapport (M = 4.05, SD = 0.79) than participants exposed 
to the direct interview protocol (M = 3.55, SD = 0.96), t(139) = 3.43, p < .001, d = 0.58, 95% 
CI [0.24, 0.91].  
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Coding 
Strategy use.  The strategies that the participants reported to have used were divided 
into six categories; prove capability, conceal, self-presentation, explain, negotiate, and other. 
Two categories, conceal and self-presentation, were drawn from previous research in the 
counter-interview strategies of suspects (Hartwig et al., 2010) and two categories, prove 
capability and explain, were drawn from previous research into counter-interview strategies of 
threateners (Geurts et al., 2016). The category negotiate was added because of the business-like 
nature of the case (i.e. work conflict, financial request). Strategies that did not fit any of these 
five categories were coded as other. The participants could report more than one strategy. Two 
coders, both blind to the hypotheses of the study, categorised the strategies. Based on 20% of 
the material, an interrater agreement of 87% was established (Cohen’s κ = .65). After settling 
the disagreements, one coder coded the remaining material. 
 
Information provision. All interviews were transcribed and coded for the amount and 
type of information disclosed. The background story given to the participants consisted of 45 
pieces of information (see Appendix A). These information pieces suited the interview 
questions (see Appendix B). That is, the participants could use the background information to 
answer the questions that they were about to receive. For instance, the information piece ‘You 
kept track of your working hours while working for the company’ could be used to answer the 
question ‘Why do you think that your case is a strong case?’ Again, two coders, unaware of the 
hypotheses, separately coded 20% of the material. The coders counted which information pieces 
were present in each transcript and reached an interrater agreement of 89% (Cohen’s κ = .73). 
One coder continued coding the rest of the material.  
 
Results 
Hypotheses Testing 
Strategy use. Nearly all participants (n = 108, 90%) reported to have used a strategy 
during the interview. Almost half of them (n = 49, 45.4%) reported a single strategy, while the 
majority (N = 59, 55.6%) stated to have used a combination of two to four different strategies. 
As can be seen in Table 7, the most frequently reported strategies were prove capability (‘Show 
them that my evidence would hold in court’) and conceal (‘Answer as vaguely as possible’). 
Other reported strategies were self-presentation (‘Appear professional and credible’), explain  
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Table 7 
Frequencies of Threateners’ Self-Reported Counter-Interview Strategies 
  Interview protocol  
Strategy Total Direct Rapport χ2 
Prove capability  59 (49.2%) 34 (56.7%) 25 (41.7%) 2.70 
Conceal  56 (46.7%) 32 (53.3%) 24 (40.0%) 2.14 
Self-presentation  27 (22.5%) 9 (15.0%) 18 (30.0%) 3.87 
Explain 21 (17.5%) 8 (13.3%) 13 (21.7%) 1.44 
Negotiate 9 (7.5%) 5 (8.3%) 4 (6.7%) 0.12 
Other 18 (15.0%) 10 (16.7%) 8 (13.3%) 0.26 
No strategy 12 (10.0%) 6 (10.0%) 6 (10.0%) 0.00 
Note. Threateners could report more than one strategy; thus, percentages do not add up to 100%. 
The χ2 values refer to the difference between the direct and rapport-based interview conditions in 
the proportion of participants who reported the strategy. None of these tests were statistically 
significant at p < .05 (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
(‘Make them understand my difficult situation’), negotiate (‘Show willingness to reach an 
agreement’), and other (‘Take over control by asking questions back’). The two strategies that 
were most often used in combination were prove capacity and conceal (n = 32).  
The number of participants who claimed to have used a strategy was the same across 
interview conditions (n = 54 [90%] in both conditions). Chi-square tests did not reveal any 
significant differences in the extent to which participants in the rapport-based interview 
condition and the direct interview condition reported to have used the different type of 
strategies, all ps < .343 (Bonferroni corrected). Thus, there was no effect of interview protocol 
on reported strategy use, meaning that Hypothesis 1 was not supported.  
 
Information provision. Participants were found to be moderately forthcoming, with an 
average disclosure of 12.74 (SD = 4.67) information pieces per person out of the total of 45 
pieces (i.e. 28.3%). An independent t-test revealed that participants in the rapport-based 
interview condition (M = 13.45, SD = 4.93) and direct interview condition (M = 12.05, SD = 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 48 
4.37) did not differ significantly with respect to the amount of information provided, t(118) = 
1.63, p = .106, d = 0.30, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.66]. This means that Hypothesis 2 is rejected.  
 
Willingness to enact. To test the effect of the interview on willingness to enact the 
threat, a 2 (Protocol: direct vs. rapport-based) × 2 (Time: before interview vs. after interview) 
mixed ANOVA was performed with participants’ willingness ratings as the dependent measure. 
Cell means are reported in Table 8. No main effect of protocol was found, F(1, 118) = 0.69, p 
= .407, ƞp² = 0.006, 90% CI [.000, .048]. However, the analysis revealed a main effect of Time, 
F(1, 118) = 12.79, p < .001, ƞp² = .098, 90% CI [.029, .187], indicating that participants were 
significantly more willing to enact the threat after (M = 6.35, SD = 1.81) than before the 
interview (M = 5.84, SD = 1.76). There was no significant Protocol × Time interaction, F(1, 
118) = 1.42, p = .236, ƞp² = .012, 90% CI [.000, .063]. Thus, the amount of change between 
before- and after-interview ratings did not differ significantly between the two interview 
protocols, rejecting Hypothesis 3. 
  
Willingness to interact. To test the effect of the type of interview on participants’ 
willingness to interact with the company, a 2 (Protocol) × 2 (Time) mixed ANOVA was 
performed (for cell means, see Table 8). No main effect of interview protocol was found, F(1, 
118) = 0.07, p = .794, ƞp² = .001, 90% CI [.000, .024]. However, the analysis again revealed a 
main effect of time, F(1, 118) = 30.06, p < .001, ƞp² = .203, 90% CI [.104, .303], showing that 
participants were significantly less willing to interact with the company after (M = 5.29, SD = 
2.10) than before the interview (M = 6.16, SD = 1.78). There was no significant Protocol × 
Time interaction, F(1, 118) = 2.39, p = .626, ƞp² = .020, 90% CI [.000, .078]. Thus, the rate of  
 
Table 8 
Means of Before- and After-Interview Ratings as a Function of Interview Protocol  
 Willingness to enact  Willingness to interact 
Interview protocol Before After  Before After 
Direct 5.87 (1.74) 6.56 (1.68)  6.24 (1.81) 5.29 (2.14) 
Rapport 5.80 (1.79) 6.15 (1.93)  6.08 (1.75) 5.28 (2.08) 
Note. Both willingness to enact and willingness to interact were rated on 9-point Likert 
scales. Values in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
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decline of willingness to interact with the company did not differ between the two interview 
protocols, rejecting Hypothesis 4. 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
The main analyses were conducted for the overall amount of information provided. 
However, from an applied perspective, some information might be more critical than other 
information. Hence, 12 raters were asked to read the case and to select the 8 to 12 (out of 45) 
pieces of information that they considered to be the most critical for assessing the risk that the 
main character in the case would cause harm. An independent t-test was conducted with the  
information pieces that were selected by five or more raters (n = 15). On average, participants 
revealed 5.80 (SD = 2.19) out of 15 pieces of this critical information. No significant difference 
was found between participants in the rapport-based interview condition (M = 6.07, SD = 2.36) 
and participants in the direct interview condition (M = 5.53, SD = 2.67), t(118) = 1.16, p = .248, 
d = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.57].  
To examine whether strategy choice influenced the amount and type of information 
provided, independent t-tests were conducted with respect to the two most frequently reported 
strategies—prove capability and conceal. First, participants with the strategy prove capability 
did not provide a significantly different amount of detail on the implementation of the threat 
(M = 4.39, SD = 2.94) than did participants who did not employ this particular strategy (M = 
3.85, SD = 2.57), t(118) = 1.07, p = .288, d = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.55]. Second, the participants 
who reported to have used the strategy conceal provided on average about two details less (M 
= 11.64, SD = 5.12) than did participants who did not use this particular strategy (M = 13.70, 
SD = 4.09), t(118) = 2.45, p = .016, d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.09, 0.81].  
In total, 56 participants reported to have used the strategy conceal. Some of these 
participants (n = 33) were vague in their descriptions about what information they withheld 
(e.g. ‘I left out the important details’), whereas others (n = 23) specified which type of 
information they concealed. The latter group reported to have concealed three types of 
information: (i) information about persons that could help them implement the threat (e.g. the 
names of a potential witness, companion, or legal counsellor; n = 19), (ii) information about 
their own vulnerability (e.g. emotional or financial problems; n = 7), and (iii) specific pieces of 
evidence (e.g. documentation that proved their argument; n = 5). Participants could report to 
have concealed more than one type of information. 
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Moreover, the participants who reported to have used the strategy conceal were found 
to be significantly more willing to enact the threat before the interview (M = 6.29, SD = 1.60) 
than were the participants who did not report to have used this particular strategy (M = 5.44, 
SD = 1.81), t(118) = 2.69, p = .008, d = 0.49, 95% CI [0.13, 0.86]. This finding might imply 
that those with more serious implementation intentions more often chose to conceal 
information. However, no correlation was found between willingness to enact the threat and the 
amount of information provided, r = .069, p = .455, 95% CI [-.112, .245].  
Finally, we examined to what extent participants’ initial attitudes toward enacting the 
threat and attitudes toward interacting with the conflicting party (before-interview ratings) 
correlated with their attitudes after the interview. Positive correlations were found between 
before- and after-interview ratings for willingness to enact the threat, r = .604, p < .001, 95% 
CI [.476, .707], and willingness to interact with the conflicting party, r = .609, p < .001, 95% 
CI [.482, .711]. In a similar vein, only 21 participants (17.5%) changed the direction of their 
willingness to enact the threat (n = 7 willing to unwilling; n = 14 unwilling to willing) after the 
interview compared to before, and only 29 (24.2%) of the participants changed the direction of 
their willingness to interact with the conflicting party (n = 23 willing to unwilling; n = 6 
unwilling to willing). A change in direction was counted when participants rated an average 
value greater than 5 (on a 9-point Likert scale) before the interview, and an average value lower 
than 5 after the interview—and vice versa. Two 3 (Change: unwilling to willing; willing to 
unwilling; no directional change) × 2 (Protocol: direct vs. rapport-based) chi-square tests 
revealed no significant differences between interview conditions for the number of participants 
that changed the direction of their willingness to enact the threat, χ2(2, N = 120) = 0.52, p = 
.771, φ = .07, or to interact with the conflicting party, χ2(2, N = 120) = 0.05, p = .973, φ = .02. 
No correlation was found between the participants’ willingness to enact the threat and 
their willingness to interact with the conflicting party. This result was true for the before-
interview ratings (r = -.106, p = .249) as well as for the after-interview ratings (r = -.054, p = 
.559).    
 
Discussion 
Replicating the findings of Study II, threateners were found to be semi-cooperative 
when questioned about their harmful intentions. They were willing to discuss their case and 
provided, on average, one third of the information held (and approximately 40% of the critical 
information held), but most of them (90%) were also strategic in presenting their case. The most 
frequently reported strategies were to prove capability (“Show them that my evidence would 
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hold in court”) and conceal (“Answer as vaguely as possible”). These findings imply that 
threateners use a mix of forthcoming and withholding strategies attempting to strike a deliberate 
balance between proving their standpoint and concealing details.   
Contrary to expectations, no differences were found between interview protocols for 
participants’ strategy use (rejecting H1), information provision (rejecting H2), or willingness 
to carry out the threat (rejecting H3) or discuss the case (rejecting H4). These outcomes stand 
in contrast to previous research supporting the efficacy of rapport-based interviewing over 
accusatorial or direct interviewing (Bull, 2013; Meissner et al., 2014). Two possible 
explanations for the null results are proposed. First, the rapport-promoting elements in the 
rapport-based interview protocol may have been too weak, implying that more profound means 
are needed to steer the interviewees’ behaviour. The pilot study revealed that the rapport-based 
interview protocol was perceived as significantly more rapport-promoting than the direct 
interview protocol, but these ratings did not differ much in absolute terms (i.e., the rapport-
based and direct protocols received average ratings of 4.05 and 3.55 on a 7-point scale, 
respectively). Moreover, an average score of 4.05 on a 7-point scale suggests that the rapport-
based protocol was rapport-promoting only to a moderate extent. Second, the case scenario 
reflected an economic argument which may have been too rational (rather than emotional) in 
nature. It has been suggested that rational (or instrumental) crises with a typical win-lose 
structure are best confronted with logical arguments as opposed to rapport-building approaches 
(Giebels & Taylor, 2010).  
Exploratory analyses revealed that interviewing had an escalating rather than 
deescalating effect, regardless of the interview protocol. Specifically, threateners were more 
willing to carry out the threat after the interview than before and were also less willing to 
interact with the conflicting party after the interview than before. Furthermore, initial attitudes 
of the threateners were found to be predictive of post-interview attitudes. Those who were 
relatively more eager to carry out the threat or interact with the conflicting party from the start 
were also relatively more eager to do so after the interview. Importantly, participants initially 
more positive towards carrying out the threat chose to conceal information more often, 
especially information concerning the actual implementation of the threat (e.g. names of contact 
persons, specific pieces of evidence). This finding suggests that threateners with serious intent 
to strike may employ more avoidant strategies than bluffers.  
 
Study IV 
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Study IV was an online study with threat assessment professionals and non-
professionals. The study investigated whether threat assessments made by professionals were 
of higher quality than those made by non-professionals. Based on research on expert 
performance, quality was defined by the ability to perform consistently (as compared with 
peers) and base decisions on relevant information (Dror, 2016; Einhorn, 1974). Specifically, it 
was predicted that professionals would agree more with one another with respect to risk 
assessments as compared to non-professionals (Hypothesis 1) and that professionals’ search for 
information would be comparatively more in line with empirically supported threat cues 
(Hypothesis 2). Threat cues were defined as pieces of information that indicate an increased 
risk for violence. The manuscript of Study IV was published in the Journal of Investigative 
Psychology and Offender Profiling (see Appendix G). 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 141 participants completed the survey. The sample consisted of 45 assessment 
professionals (30 men, 15 women, Mage = 44.87 years, SD = 10.13 years), 46 university students 
(12 men, 34 women, Mage = 27.42 years, SD = 9.97 years), and 50 laypersons (19 men, 31 
women, Mage = 42.48 years, SD = 13.01 years). The sample size was guided by the number of 
professionals that could be recruited, meaning that the number of students and laypersons was 
matched with the number of professionals that participated. The reason for including two non-
professional samples (students and laypersons) was that students may not fully represent the 
non-professional population, as they are studying to become professionals of some kind 
themselves. Working experience in threat assessment averaged 12.70 years (SD = 8.96) in the 
professional sample. One participant in the professional sample reported to have just one year 
of working experience in threat assessment and seven participants in the non-professional 
samples reported to have more than one year of working experience in threat assessment. The 
data of these eight individuals were excluded from further analyses. One hundred and thirty-
three participants remained, of whom 44 were professionals (30 men, 14 women, Mage = 45.23 
years, SD = 9.95 years), 44 were students (12 men, 32 women, Mage = 26.53 years, SD = 8.63 
years), and 45 were laypersons (17 men, 28 women, Mage = 42.09 years, SD = 12.80 years)1. 
                                                          
1 Gender and age, when included as covariates in statistical analyses, did not change the pattern of the results and 
will be disregarded in the reported analyses. 
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Professionals were approached via associations of threat assessment professionals in 
Europe (Association of European Threat Assessment Professionals, AETAP) and in Canada 
(Canadian Association of Threat Assessment Professionals, CATAP) to take part in a survey 
on threat assessment. They were either members of these associations, attended a conference 
on threat assessment in April 2016 that was organised by AETAP, or they were recommended 
as eligible participants by those who were initially approached. The countries in which the 
professionals operated were Canada (n = 9), The Netherlands (n = 8), Germany (n = 7), the 
United States (n = 3), Australia (n = 3), worldwide (n = 3), Austria, Belgium, Hong Kong, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, South-Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland (all n ≤ 2). Professionals 
were not financially rewarded for their participation.  
Students and laypersons were recruited for a study about how people make risk 
judgments. Students were approached via the participant pool of the University of Gothenburg 
(Sweden) where they had signed up for participation in psychological research. They were each 
compensated 50 SEK (approx. 6 USD). Laypersons were approached online through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were each paid 0.50 USD upon completion. Participants in the 
laypersons sample were from the United States (n = 41) and India (n = 9).  All participants 
completed the same survey. The data collection took place from April to June 2016. 
 
Materials 
Three fictitious cases were constructed in which a person posed a potential threat of 
violence towards one or several other persons. To prevent the outcomes from being the result 
of one particular case or one particular domain of violence, each case reflected a different 
domain of violence that is commonly encountered in the field of threat assessment. These 
domains were intimate partner violence (case “Terry”), public figure violence (case “Marc”), 
and workplace violence (case “Frank”). Case Terry described a domestic conflict in which a 
man, Terry, poses a potential threat towards his ex-girlfriend for breaking up with him. Case 
Marc described a case in which a university student in chemistry, Marc, poses a potential threat 
towards the Minister of Health and Social Affairs, as Marc holds him responsible for colluding 
with corrupt parties in the pharmaceutical industry. Case Frank describes a work conflict in 
which an employee, Frank, utters a written threat towards his employer and colleagues after he 
was informed that he might lose his job due to forced redundancies.  
Each case consisted of 15 to 21 information cues describing i) the context in which the 
threat evolved and ii) the behaviours and characteristics of the person posing the threat. Each 
information cue in the cases was selected based on risk factors and protective factors that have 
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been found to be empirically valid. For instance, the information cue Frank’s position within 
the firm is uncertain reflected the risk factor “employment instability” (Feldman & Johnson, 
1996). Protective factors are conditions and behaviours that may reduce the risk of violence, 
which can also be the absence of risk factors (Borum, 2000). For instance, the information cue 
Frank joins a running group twice a week indicated the absence of the risk factor “social 
isolation” (Meloy, White, & Hart, 2013). In addition to the risk and protective factors, each case 
held two pieces of neutral information. That is, information that is not empirically known to 
increase or decrease the risk for violence as such (e.g. having tattoos). Two experienced threat 
assessment professionals provided feedback on the cases. They read the case scenarios (see 
Appendix H) and judged the cases to be similar to those they would encounter in their 
profession, and hence, perceived the storylines as relevant and realistic.  
 
Procedure  
The first page of the survey stated that the study included three descriptions of separate 
cases in which a person poses a potential threat. The participants were instructed to read each 
case and to answer the accompanying questions. Participants were informed that participating 
was confidential, voluntary, and for research purposes only. After agreeing on these terms, they 
were presented with the first case, followed by three questions. First, participants were asked 
to assess the overall risk for physical violence currently posed by the main character (0% = no 
risk for violence, 100% = guaranteed risk for violence; any number between 0 and 100 could 
be selected). Next, they were presented with a list of specific information cues derived from the 
case. They were asked to assess the extent to which each information cue increased or decreased 
the risk for violence in this particular case (e.g. Frank’s position within the firm is uncertain; -
4 = very strong decrease, 0 = neutral, 4 = very strong increase). Finally, participants were asked 
to list up to five additional information cues that they would request in order to make a more 
adequate assessment of the risk for violence for this particular case. The same procedure was 
repeated for each case. The cases were presented in a randomised order.  
After completing the case-related questions, participants provided their age, gender, and 
number of years working in the field of threat assessment. In addition, professionals were asked 
to indicate in which country they worked and how they were professionally involved in threat 
assessment (e.g. screening and security, criminal intelligence gathering). Students and 
laypersons were asked to indicate their country of residence and their employment status (e.g. 
student, employed for wages). Participants needed approximately 30 minutes to complete the 
survey. 
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Data Analyses  
Coding. Two research assistants coded the information cues requested by the 
participants. First, the total number of requested information cues was counted per participant 
per case (ranging from 1 to 5). Second, each information request was classified as ‘key request’ 
or ‘other request’. A request was considered a ‘key request’ when it matched one of the 11 key 
questions identified by Vossekuil, Fein, and Berglund (2015). These key questions are supposed 
to cover all areas that should be inquired in order to make a fully informed assessment about a 
person posing a threat. Information requests that did not fit any of the key questions were 
categorised as ‘other request’. The ‘other requests’ were then further qualified into specific 
areas of inquiry. All areas of inquiry specifying ‘key requests’ and ‘other requests’ are listed in 
Table 9. Two coders categorised a random 30% of the material into ‘key requests’ vs. ‘other  
 
Table 9  
Areas of Inquiry Used to Classify Requested Information  
Key requests (Vossekuil et al., 2015)  
1. What are the subject’s motives and goals?  
2. What has the subject communicated about his or her intentions to anyone (target, law 
enforcement, family, friends, colleagues, associates, diary/journal)?  
3. Is there evidence that the subject has engaged in attack-related behaviours?  
4. Is there evidence that the subject has engaged in menacing, harassing, and/or stalking type 
behaviour? 
5. Does the subject have a history of mental illness involving command hallucinations, delusional 
ideas, feelings of persecution, and so forth, with indications that the subject has acted on those 
beliefs? 
6. How organised is the subject? Does the subject have the ability to plan and execute a violent 
action?  
7. Is there evidence that the subject is experiencing feelings of hopelessness, desperation, or 
despair? 
8. Is what the subject says consistent with his or her actions?  
9. Does the subject see violence as acceptable, desirable, or the only way to solve problems?  
10. What concerns do those who know the subject have about the subject’s behaviour?  
11. What factors in the subject’s life and/or environment could change and thereby increase the 
subject’s risk of attacking? What factors could change and thereby decrease the risk posed?  
Other requests 
1. Requests about upbringing  
2. Requests about criminal records that do not concern violence or stalking  
3. Requests about drugs, alcohol and medication that do not concern mental illness  
4. Requests about protective factors that do not concern the future  
5. Requests about finances without a specified reason for the request  
6. Requests that do not fit any of the previous categories  
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requests’ (85.71%, Cohen’s κ = .71) and further specified the requests into one of 17 specific 
areas of inquiry (74.44%, Cohen’s κ = .66). One coder completed codings on the remaining 
material. 
 
Results 
Initial Analysis of Risk Assessments 
 To reiterate, the assignment of a risk value (1 = very strong decrease, 9 = very strong 
increase) to one information cue was considered one assessment. The three cases together 
contained 57 information cues. Hence, each participant made 57 assessments of specific 
information cues. One-sample t-tests revealed that professionals assessed information cues that 
reflected risk factors as risk increasing (i.e. the average rating was significantly higher than the 
neutral value “5”; Mprofessional = 6.44, SD = 0.56, t(43) = 17.14, p < .001, d = 5.17), and 
information cues that reflected protective factors as risk decreasing (i.e. the average rating was 
significantly lower than the neutral value “5”; Mprofessional = 3.90, SD = 0.74, t(43) = 9.93, p < 
.001, d = 2.99). Information cues that reflected neither risk factors nor protective factors were 
rated as neutral (i.e. the average rating was statistically similar to the neutral value “5”; 
Mprofessional = 4.97, SD = 0.48, t(43) = 0.45, p < .652, d = 0.14). Students and laypersons made 
ratings similar to those of professionals for risk factors (Mstudent= 6.31, SD = 0.56, t(43)= 15.37, 
p < .001, d = 4.63; Mlayperson = 6.05, SD = 0.98, t(44)= 7.18, p < .001, d = 2.14) and for protective 
factors (Mstudent = 4.16, SD = 1.06, t(43)= 5.27, p < .001, d = 1.59: Mlayperson = 3.86, SD = 1.25, 
t(44)= 6.01, p < .001, d = 1.79). However, the neutral cues were rated as neutral by laypersons 
(Mlayperson = 4.72, SD = 1.27, t(44)= 1.44, p = .156, d = 0.43), but as risk decreasing by students 
(Mstudent = 4.49, SD = 1.34, t(43)= 2.56, p = .014, d = 0.78). 
 The mean values for each information cue are displayed in Figure 2. As shown in the 
figure, the professionals’ assessments were highly similar to the assessments of the non-
professionals. Only two out of 57 information cues were assessed in one direction by 
professionals (risk decrease) and in the other direction by non-professionals (neutral / risk 
increase). Although this could have been the result of chance, the two items (Rebecca has 
avoided all contact with Terry; Rebecca has received a new telephone number and moved to 
another neighbourhood) reflected a similar theme, which was, contact between victim and 
threatener in partner violence. Furthermore, participants in all three samples assigned the 
highest risk values to information cues that reflected a communicated threat. 
Besides assessing specific information cues, participants were asked to judge the overall 
risk for violence for each case (0% = no risk, 100% = guaranteed risk). A 3 (Sample:  
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Figure 2. Risk assessments (1 = very strong risk decrease, 9 = very strong risk increase) that 
professionals, students, and laypersons made for the information cues presented per case. 
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Table 10  
Mean Percentages for Violence Risk per Case Judged by Professionals, Students, and 
Laypersons 
 Professionals Students Laypersons 
Case “Marc” 43.05% (20.17) 46.11% (20.75) 43.56% (24.54) 
Case “Terry”  57.83% (23.84) 76.07% (17.29) 71.98% (17.53) 
Case “Frank” 48.62% (23.87) 47.73% (22.25) 55.44% (20.89) 
Note. Mean percentages are based on a rating scale ranging from 0% (no risk for violence) to 
100% (guaranteed risk for violence). The numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
 
professionals vs. students vs. laypersons) × 3 (Case: Terry vs. Marc vs. Frank) mixed ANOVA 
was performed on the violent risk ratings, with Sample as the between-subjects factor. The 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 10. The analysis showed no significant main effect 
of Sample, F(2, 128) = 3.04, p = .05 , ƞp² = .05, but there was a significant main effect of Case,  
F(2, 128) = 61.51, p < .001, ƞp² = .33. Participants judged the risk for violence in case “Terry” 
significantly higher than in case “Frank”, F(1, 128) = 55.84, p < .001, ƞp² = .30, and they judged 
the risk in case “Frank” significantly higher than in case “Marc”, F(1, 128) = 8.90, p < .01, ƞp² 
= .06. Furthermore, the analysis yielded a significant Sample × Case interaction effect, F(4, 
256) = 4.01, p = .004, ƞp² = .06. Tests of simple effects revealed different risk assessments 
across samples for case “Terry”, F(2, 128) = 10.09, p = < .001, ƞp² = .14. Professionals judged 
the overall risk for violence lower than did students (p < .001) and laypersons (p = .001). No 
difference was found between students and laypersons (p = .329). Furthermore, no differences 
across samples were found for case “Mark”, F(2, 128) = 0.24, p = .784, ƞp² = .04, or for the 
case “Frank” , F(2, 128) = 1.59, p = .208, ƞp² = .02.  
Hypothesis Testing  
 Agreement. Agreement among assessors becomes apparent in the standard deviation of 
their ratings, with the lower the standard deviation, the more similar the ratings.  A 3 (Sample: 
professionals vs. students vs. laypersons) × 3 (Case: Terry vs. Marc vs. Frank) between-items 
ANOVA was conducted on the standard deviations for the information cues. A main effect for 
Sample occurred, F(2, 162) = 106.67, p < .001, ƞp² = .568. Planned contrasts showed that the 
average standard deviation within the professional sample (M = 1.14, SD = 0.21) was 
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significantly lower than the average standard deviation within the student sample (M = 1.48, 
SD = 0.26, p <.001) and the layperson sample (M = 1.75, SD = 0. 91, p < .001). Post hoc tests 
further revealed that the difference between the student sample and the layperson sample was 
significant (p < .001). The main effect of Case was not statically significant, F(2, 162) = 0.52, 
p = .598, ƞp² = .006, neither was the Sample x Case interaction effect,  F(4, 162) = 1.51, p = 
.200, ƞp² = .036. Thus, the results indicate that the consensus among the professionals was 
systematically (i.e. regardless of the case) higher than the consensus among the non-
professionals. This supports Hypothesis 1.   
The above analysis does not account for where on the 9-point scale the spread was 
located. Spread on the lower (1-3), central (4-6), or higher part (7-9) of the scale was weighted 
equally. However, when examining agreement using this scale, the spread on the central part 
may be particularly relevant because it contains both a risk decreasing value (4) and a risk 
increasing value (6). More specific, agreement on the direction of risk (i.e. increase or decrease) 
can be considered more critical than agreement on the magnitude of risk (e.g. strong increase 
or very strong increase). To test for differences between samples in agreement on direction, a 
chi-square test was performed on the number of confidence intervals within each sample that 
included the central value of the scale (“5”). Confidence intervals containing the middle value 
imply that some participants in the sample rated the information as risk decreasing (values 
below 5), whereas others in the sample rated the same information as risk increasing (values 
above 5). The six neutral information cues were excluded from the analysis because these cues 
were expected to obtain ratings close to the value of 5. The analysis was conducted on the 
assessments of the remaining 51 information cues. A significant difference across samples was 
found with regard to the number of confidence intervals containing the value 5, χ2 (2, N = 153) 
= 8.70, p = .013, φ = .24. In further support of Hypothesis 1, professionals rarely disagreed with 
each other on whether information should be assessed as risk increasing or risk decreasing (N 
= 3, 5.9%), whereas such disagreement among laypersons occurred in approximately one third 
of the assessments made (N = 14, 27.5%, p < .05). The frequency of disagreement among 
students (N = 8, 15.7%) was not found to be significantly different from the other two samples.  
 
Information search. After assessing the risk for violence, participants were asked to 
list up to five additional information cues that they considered relevant for making a more 
adequate assessment. The requested information cues were classified into ‘key requests’ and 
‘other requests’, and further divided into different areas of inquiry (see the Method section). 
ANOVA’s were conducted for each case on (a) the total number of information requests, (b)  
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Table 11 
Means and Inferential Statistics for the Analyses of the Requested Information 
Measure Professionals Students Laypersons F p ƞp² 
Case “Marc” 
No. of information pieces requested         3.66 (1.55) 2.16 (1.60) 2.56 (1.67) 10.27 .000 .136 
‘key requests’  2.68 (1.63) 1.18 (1.08) 1.62 (1.13) 15.42 .000 .192 
‘other requests’ 0.98 (1.00) 0.95 (1.18) 0.93 (1.23) 0.02 .984 .000 
No. of areas inquired 3.23 (1.46) 1.86 (1.31) 2.13 (1.34) 12.24 .000 .158 
Case “Terry” 
No. of information pieces requested 3.91 (1.54) 2.11 (1.70) 2.51 (1.53) 14.68 .000 .185 
‘key requests’  2.64 (1.63) 1.07 (1.19) 1.22 (0.97) 22.70 .000 .260 
‘other requests’ 1.27 (1.11) 1.05 (1.16) 1.29 (1.49) 0.25 .779 .004 
No. of areas inquired 2.95 (1.40) 1.64 (1.33) 1.91 (1.02) 12.46 .000 .162 
Case “Frank” 
No. of information pieces requested  3.82 (1.72) 2.27 (1.48) 2.49 (1.62) 11.93 .000 .155 
‘key requests’  2.64 (1.54) 1.34 (1.12) 1.56 (1.16) 12.84 .000 .165 
‘other requests’ 1.18 (1.24) 0.98 (1.30) 0.93 (1.16) 0.51 .602 .008 
No. of areas inquired 3.11 (1.56) 2.00 (1.24) 2.09 (1.26) 9.15 .000 .123 
Note. The numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
the number of ‘key requests’, (c) the number of ‘other requests’, and (d) the number of different 
areas that were inquired. The latter measure served as an indication for the variety of the 
requested information. Descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 11. Planned 
contrasts confirmed Hypothesis 2. Professionals requested significantly more key information  
than students (all cases p < .001) and laypersons (all cases p < .001). Furthermore, requests that 
were made by professionals covered significantly more different areas of inquiry compared to 
requests made by students (all cases p < .001) or laypersons (all cases p ≤ .001). Post-hoc tests 
showed no differences between students and laypersons on any of the measures. Thus, when 
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given the opportunity to gather additional data, professionals requested comparatively more 
relevant information and from a comparatively wider variety of domains. 
Discussion 
The results demonstrated support for both hypotheses. A higher level of consensus was 
found among professionals than among students and laypersons (supporting H1). Moreover, 
the professionals requested comparatively more relevant information (i.e. key requests) and 
their requests covered a wider range of topics (supporting H2). These findings held true in all 
three cases. Both measures (inter-rater agreement and empirically supported decision-making) 
reflect quality standards in expert performance (Dror, 2016; Einhorn, 1974). Hence, the results 
suggest that domain-specific experience adds to the quality of threat assessment practices. That 
said, risk assessments were found to be strikingly similar across all three groups. Professionals’ 
beliefs of which cues were (and were not) alarming were very similar to those of non-
professionals. This finding suggests that actual assessment of information in threat cases may, 
in part, reflect common sense.  
The results of Study IV fit neatly with previous research on expertise and risk perception 
in which professionals were found to excel at cue selection (i.e. what information should be 
looked for) (Elstein & Schwarz, 2002; Fahsing & Ask, 2016) but not assumed (Slovic & Weber, 
2002) or found to be better at cue assessment (i.e. how the information should be interpreted; 
Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016). In brief, threat assessment professionals may 
contribute most to the process of gathering (rather than assessing) information.  
One shortcoming of the study was that it did not tap into the participants’ reasoning 
behind their assessments. Therefore, it remains unknown if (and if so, how) participants 
connected the information cues to possible risk factors. For instance, suffering from diabetes 
was included as a neutral factor since diabetes has never been proven to relate to the enactment 
of threats. However, a participant could have reasoned that suffering from a chronic disease is 
a stressful condition and should thus be assessed as information that is risk increasing. Such 
reasoning would be in line with research showing that personal stressors may indeed indicate a 
higher risk for violence (Meloy et al., 2013). Another potential concern is that the cues in the 
cases may have been self-evident, meaning that their interpretation was straightforward. For 
example, the cue Marc is highly frustrated that the Minister has not replied. It is quite clear that 
frustration is risk increasing rather than risk decreasing. If the information given was less 
ambiguous than the information threat assessors typically face in real life, this may form an 
alternative explanation for the similarities found between the professionals and non-
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professionals. A final note is warranted on a possible bias in the professional sample. 
Professionals may have been more motivated than non-professionals as the study concerned 
their own field of expertise. This could explain the higher number of information requests on 
behalf of the professionals.  
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CHAPTER 3: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a scientific approach for threat assessment and 
management (TAM) interviewing. It is important that threat assessment professionals, to the 
fullest extent possible, engage with persons who pose a threat because only they hold first-hand 
information of their intentions and only they can change their intentions. While TAM 
interviewing has long been acknowledged and practiced, the topic has been ignored in research. 
This thesis is one of the first attempts to fill that gap. An experimental paradigm was developed 
to examine interview dynamics in a threat assessment context. The paradigm was tested and 
used in a series of studies, each addressing the topic from a slightly different angle. The first 
two studies were developed from a deception detection perspective. Specifically, is it possible 
to elicit verbal cues to deceit in threat statements (Study I) and can one interview strategically 
to create verbal cues to deceit in threat statements (Study II)? In the follow-up studies, there 
was a shift of perspective from deception detection towards risk assessment and information 
gathering. Specifically, what interview approach contributes most to information gathering and 
de-escalation in threat cases (Study III) and do threat assessment professionals gather and assess 
information in threat cases differently to non-professionals (Study IV)? Irrespective of the 
research angle (deception detection or information gathering), it is argued throughout the thesis 
that it is vital for TAM interviewers to understand what attitudes and behaviours can be 
expected from the threatener. Counter-interview strategies were therefore explored in both 
Studies II and III.  
 
Main Findings 
 
Avoidant Actualisers 
The most consistent outcome of the laboratory studies was that persons more likely to 
carry out the threat were found to be less informative about its implementation. In Studies I and 
II, the likelihood of carrying out the threat was manipulated by assigning participants to either 
bluff about the threat (bluffers) or actualise the threat (actualisers). Actualisers in both studies 
disclosed fewer details than bluffers regarding how they would carry out the threat. In Study 
III, it was found that persons who reported to be more willing to carry out the threat more often 
reported to have concealed information as part of their strategy. In particular, they reported to 
have withheld information that could aid the implementation of the threat, such as contact 
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details of accomplices. In all three lab-studies, bluffers and actualisers were found to be equally 
informative on a general level when explaining their case and their motivation for threatening.  
These findings are neither in line with the experience of professionals, nor theory and 
research in cognitive psychology. For instance, according to the FBI’s National Center for the 
Analysis of Violent Crimes (NCAVC), the more detailed a threat is, the more serious the risk 
for actual implementation (O’Toole, 2009). Their reasoning parallels the Construal Level 
Theory (CLT) holding that the specifics of an event dominate people’s minds if the event is 
likely to occur (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Supporting the CLT, previous research has shown 
that people tend to give detailed accounts describing events they believe to be likely to happen 
(Wakslak et al., 2006) or when describing actions they truly intend to carry out (Mac Giolla, et 
al., 2013; Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2015; Sooniste et al., 2014; 2015).  
Despite being based on evidence and logic, the CLT was not supported in the present 
studies on threat assessment. This outcome might be best explained in the light of self-
regulation (Fiske & Macrae, 2012). Concretely, the mind-set of actualisers might be detailed 
and implementation-oriented, but, to prevent others from interfering with their plans, actualisers 
must conceal critical details from the conflicting party. Avoidant regulation strategies (e.g. 
keeping the story simple, avoiding lies) have been found to be particularly common in 
interrogations with guilty suspects who have a need to conceal criminal involvement (Hartwig 
et al., 2007; Strömwall et al., 2006). In threat cases, critical details are most likely to be about 
the implementation of the threat (i.e. how-related details). For instance, an actualiser who leaks 
the time or location of the planned attack allows authorities to arrange for extra security 
measures. Moreover, revealing the names of accomplices could hinder successful 
implementation and challenge social bonds. Thus, actualisers maintain a critical advantage by 
concealing information from the interviewer.   
Practically, the present findings imply that detailed threat accounts should not 
automatically be interpreted as cause for concern. Yet, suggesting the opposite (“He is 
elaborating on the implementation of the threat so he is probably bluffing”) would be taking a 
step too far. For starters, the studies within this thesis did not directly test the diagnostic value 
of implementation details in threat statements. Furthermore, previous studies that did examine 
the ability to distinguish between statements of true and false intent revealed error rates of 
approximately 30% (Vrij et al., 2011a, b). Such error rates are unacceptable when assessing the 
risk for violence in real cases. Perhaps, the most important conclusion to be drawn here is that 
threateners treat information about their case strategically when being questioned; they choose 
what information to reveal and conceal. This notion is valuable for TAM interviewers because 
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a strategic approach from the interviewee allows for, or even requires, a strategic approach from 
the interviewer. This topic will be discussed in more depth in the next section.  
 
Semi-Cooperative Interviewees 
Threateners’ counter-interview strategies were examined in two of the three laboratory 
studies (II and III). Threateners in both studies were found to be semi-cooperative interviewees. 
On one hand, threateners were willing to interact and share information with the interviewer, 
they truly provided a fair amount of information (25-30% of all the information they held), and 
no one refused to speak. On the other hand, nearly all threateners (90-94%) reported to have 
approached the interview strategically. Semi-cooperative attitudes were also revealed in the 
type of strategies participants reported to have used. Forthcoming strategies (e.g. “I wanted to 
show them that my evidence against them is strong”) were often combined with withholding 
strategies (e.g. “I tried to answer as vaguely as possible”).  
In brief, the findings support the self-regulation perspective which states that people 
tend to control their behaviour in social settings in order to reach desired outcomes (Fiske & 
Macrae, 2012). Self-regulation is assumed to be of particular significance in challenging social 
interactions. Examples of challenging social interactions are those in which a person must 
conceal the truth to protect matters of personal relevance (e.g. freedom, money, opportunities) 
and those in which the integrity of a person is openly questioned. Since both of these aspects 
are typically part of interrogation situations, the self-regulation perspective provides a relevant 
theoretical framework for research on how to interview suspects (DePaulo, 1992; Hartwig et 
al., 2010).  
Drawing a parallel between previous studies on suspect interviewing and the current 
findings, two things are notable. First, reported strategy use in the current studies is much higher 
than that from research on suspect interviewing. Hartwig and colleagues (2007) found that 60% 
of guilty suspects and 37% of innocent suspects reported to have had a strategy before the 
interrogation. An explanation for the high rates among threateners may be that they perceive 
the burden of explanation to rest on themselves. In contrast, suspects are involuntarily taken in 
for questioning which automatically places suspects in a comparatively more reactive position 
(“Let’s see what they have on me”). Second, the participants making threats seemed to combine 
a typical innocent-suspect attitude (being forthcoming; Strömwall et al., 2006) with a typical 
guilty-suspect attitude (being strategic; Hartwig et al., 2007). This combination might result 
from the fact that the difference between morally right (i.e. being innocent, telling the truth) 
and morally wrong (i.e. being guilty, telling a lie) is less clear when stating a threat. Bluffers 
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have no intention to commit harm, but they are guilty of lying about their intentions (i.e. 
innocent liars). Actualisers intend to commit harm, but they are honest in their claim (i.e. guilty 
truth-tellers). Taken together, both threat interviewing and suspect interviewing represent 
challenging interactions that require self-regulation by the interviewee. Yet, the act of 
threatening clearly differs from a suspect giving a statement and this could explain the unique 
patterns found in the current studies.  
The finding of forthcoming threateners fits well with professional reports that 
threateners are typically willing to discuss their case (van der Meer & Diekhuis, 2014; White, 
2014). However, the finding that threateners can be strategic in TAM interactions is rarely 
mentioned in the literature, with the exception of Meloy and Mohandie (2014) who note that 
persons posing a terror threat may use countermeasures to undermine the interview. The 
strategic aspect is an important addition. Being aware of counter-strategy use is the first step 
towards altering and exploiting it.  
 
Persistent Interviewees 
Studies II and III examined the efficacy of different interview styles but none of those 
examined led to significant differences in the interviewees’ behaviours or attitudes. Suspicion-
oriented interviewing did not result in differences between the statements of bluffers and 
actualisers (Study II). Moreover, rapport-based and direct interviewing evoked similar 
responses in terms of the threateners’ strategy use, information provision, and willingness to 
pursue or discuss the threat (Study III). These outcomes deviate from research supporting the 
efficacy of rapport-based interviewing over accusatorial or direct interviewing (Bull, 2013; 
Meissner et al., 2014), as well as from theory and research demonstrating that guilty and 
innocent suspects respond differently to the risk of not being believed (Hartwig et al., 2010).   
 The lack of impact from different interview styles may be explained by methodological 
shortcomings. The manipulation of perceived suspicion levels and rapport might not have been 
powerful enough or, perhaps, suspicion levels and rapport are not critical to TAM interviews. 
In other words, more intense manipulation or other independent variables might have been more 
influential (see also Limitations). An alternative explanation could be that threateners are 
particularly steadfast interviewees. Two of the current findings support this argument. The first 
is the frequent use of counter-interview strategies (reported in both studies) and the second is 
the correlation found between pre- and post-interview attitudes (documented in Study III). In 
other words, threateners approached the interview with a set attitude and prepared accordingly. 
Basic psychological research on persuasion has shown that persons who approach a task 
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deliberately are less affected by how a particular message is presented (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986).  
If threateners are indeed steadfast interviewees, then stronger means are needed to steer 
their behaviours. In fairness, however, it is still too early to arrive at any definite conclusions. 
These findings stem from just two laboratory studies and cannot compete with the much 
stronger body of research on the effectiveness of rapport-based and strategic interviewing 
(Meissner et al., 2017). Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that threateners in the 
current studies may have been unaffected by the style of interviewing but not by the interview 
as such. Specifically, the interview impacted the threateners’ attitudes and information 
provision, but this impact was independent of the interview style.  
 
Empirically-Driven Professionals 
Study IV examined how professional experience affects the assessment of threats of 
violence. The results demonstrated that, on average, professionals and non-professionals made 
almost identical risk assessments, but professionals agreed more with one another. Furthermore, 
professionals’ additional information requests covered more, and more relevant (empirically-
based) content as compared to the requests of non-professionals.   
The finding of identical risk assessment points towards the notion that the judging of 
threat cues may in part reflect common sense. Critically, common sense does not necessarily 
mean bad sense. The assessments of the professionals were found to conform to the literature 
(i.e. known risk factors were identified as risk increasing and known protective factors were 
identified as risk decreasing), but so were the assessments of the non-professionals. This result 
may be explained by literature on risk perception stating that risk assessment is largely affective 
in nature even when approached rationally, a phenomenon referred to as affective rationality 
(Damasio, 2001; Slovic & Weber, 2002). It has been theorised that people tend to rely on two 
different systems when assessing risk in financial, health, and safety domains: an affective 
system and a cognitive system (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). The affective 
system contains emotional reactions to risk and is inherently present in both experts and novices 
as responding to threats is deeply rooted in human evolution, while the cognitive system 
contains, among others, knowledge on probabilities of danger to occur and is more developed 
in experts than novices (Weber, 2001). This difference is mostly due to experts having a better 
notion of probabilities, whereas the general public tends to overweight infrequent but 
catastrophic events (e.g. getting caught up in a terrorist attack; Weber, 2001). However, this 
typical difference between experts and novices might not always impact risk assessments. The 
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two systems usually combine to identical risk assessments (Slovic & Weber, 2002), but, when 
emotional reactions to risk differ from cognitive assessments of risk, emotions are assumed to 
drive behaviour (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). This theory might explain how 
common sense notions on risk can overrule professional experience when assessing threats of 
violence. However, the role of emotion in professional threat assessment needs yet to be 
investigated. 
Two other findings suggest that the professionals’ performance was superior to that of 
the non-professionals. These were, higher levels of inter-rater agreement and empirically-
driven information searches. Both measures reflect quality standards in expert performance 
(Dror, 2016; Einhorn, 1974). Agreement between professionals cannot be taken for granted in 
fields of expertise. To illustrate, studies among forensic experts revealed that their conclusions 
about DNA evidence, fingerprints, and footwear identifications were often inconsistent (Dror 
& Hampikian, 2011; Majamaa & Ytti, 1996; Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2012). 
However, it should be noted that these studies examined dichotomous judgements (e.g. Could 
the suspect have contributed to the DNA mixture?). Such judgements result in clearer 
inconsistencies as compared to the continuous judgements examined in the current study (e.g. 
To what extent does this information contribute to the risk for violence?) where the spread in 
the ratings was used as a proxy for agreement. 
The finding that professionals requested empirically-based information more often than 
non-professionals may reflect a superior ability to make decisions based on relevant information 
without being biased by irrelevant contextual information (Dror, 2016). Theory and research 
into expertise suggest that experienced performers (whether criminal investigators, physicians, 
or other professionals) possess an exceptional understanding of which information is critical to 
the problem at hand and are quick to recognise this information in a larger bulk of information 
(Alison, Barrett, & Crego, 2007; Elstein & Schwarz, 2002). These competences help 
experienced performers generate more and qualitatively better hypotheses as compared to less 
advanced performers or novices (Fahsing & Ask, 2016; Wright, 2013). Thus, both the current 
findings and previous research demonstrate that experts know best what information to pursue.  
What do these findings mean in practice? First, agreement among professionals is 
reassuring as it suggests that professionals tend to reach similar conclusions. Second, threat 
assessment professionals may contribute most to the process of information gathering (as 
opposed to information assessment). This means that, in a case with limited resources, expertise 
is best utilised in tasks concerning the information search. For instance, this would involve 
evaluating what intelligence is missing or setting the scope of a TAM interview.  
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Limitations 
 
The studies rest on the assumption that social cognitions of people who threaten to cause 
harm are similar to those of people who do not (i.e. the general public). Hence, it was argued 
that experimental findings can be generalised as long as basic human dynamics are studied. A 
limitation of the studies in the thesis is that this assumption was theorised but not tested. 
Furthermore, the assumption is debatable. Threatening typically involves strong emotions, and 
personal interests are at stake. Moreover, the type of threats within the field of threat assessment 
are typically violent threats meaning that the threatener is perpetrating a criminal act by merely 
uttering the threat. These conditions were not fully mirrored in the design of the studies. 
Although the current paradigm involved a threat to damage the reputation of the conflicting 
party, the threat was not inherently illegal or even immoral. Finally, known risk factors in the 
field of threat assessment (e.g. substance abuse, violent attitudes, and mental illness) were 
probably underrepresented in the studied samples. Despite the measures taken to maximise 
external validity (see Introducing an Experimental Paradigm) and the notion that real-world 
resemblance is not always required to examine a phenomenon (Mook, 1983), no direct evidence 
was obtained on the generalisability of the present findings as the findings stem exclusively 
from lab-studies of student samples. The question therefore remains whether or not real-world 
threateners would respond similarly as compared to the participants in the studies.  
A number of limitations pertain to the interview protocols employed in the studies. First, 
the interviews might have come across as rigid to the interviewees. The prompts and questions 
comprising the protocols were carefully designed, both in phrasing and sequence, and the 
interviewers were instructed to stick to the protocols. This instruction was given for the sake of 
experimental control but might have hindered the natural flow of the interactions. Second, the 
interviews were short, particularly in Studies I and II. It is therefore unlikely they covered all 
dynamics of TAM interviewing. Third, the manipulations of suspicion (Study II) and rapport 
(Study III) might have been insufficient to result in the predicted effects. Although manipulation 
checks were found to be significant, the protocols that were supposed to communicate suspicion 
and rapport received only moderate ratings in these regards (5.44 and 4.05 on a 7-point Likert 
scale, respectively).   
The studies did not examine a sample from the population of persons who pose a threat 
without making a threat. These are persons who fully intend to carry out an attack while aiming 
to remain under the radar, such as many of the suicide bombers attacking in the name of IS. 
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This group is comparably large and obviously dangerous and, hence, forms a substantial part 
of the threat assessment domain (Vossekuil et al., 2015). Different interview dynamics could 
be expected as compared to what was found in the present research. As persons in this group 
do not seek interaction, they might be less forthcoming and would probably deny having 
harmful intentions (instead of stressing them when threatening). Thus, the data from the present 
studies might not apply to these subjects of concern. 
Another limitation is that the studies did not test for individual or cultural differences 
among threateners. Diversity issues are plausibly influential in TAM interviews. Modern 
societies are increasingly multicultural and threat assessment professionals will likely 
encounter persons with diverse ethnicities, religions, languages, and cultural practices. 
Research has shown that interviewees from different cultures can respond differently to 
interrogation and negotiation tactics such as rational persuasion, authority, and relationship-
building (Beune, Giebels, & Sanders, 2009; Beune, Giebels, & Taylor, 2010; Giebels & Taylor, 
2012). In a recent publication, Hart (2016b) cast doubt on the cross-cultural validity of risk and 
threat assessment instruments and appealed to professionals to enhance general awareness of 
diversity issues. The present research fails to answer this call. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged 
here that it is important to address cultural and individual differences in research and practice 
in TAM interviewing (see Future Research).  
This final remark is more a nuance than limitation. This thesis does not advocate TAM 
interviewing as the solution to all threat cases. There are plenty of imaginable circumstances in 
which authorities should decide to not interview. For instance, cases in which the safety of the 
interviewer cannot be guaranteed, in which an interview would interfere with an ongoing 
investigation (and the threat is not imminent), in which the mental condition of the threatener 
hinders a coherent conversation (e.g. they suffer from a psychosis), or in which it is impossible 
to reach or trace the threatener (e.g. threatener is located in a warzone; threat is a cyber-threat). 
However, it is argued here that refraining from interviewing in threat cases should be a 
conscious decision and not a default scenario.  
 
Future Research 
 
One way of moving TAM interviewing research forward is to increase its sheer quantity. 
The number of studies examining TAM interviewing is far behind the corpus of interview 
studies within the related fields of interrogation, negotiation, and intelligence gathering. On a 
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general level, additional research could refine existing theories and terminology in threat 
assessment. For instance, is there a difference between risk assessment and threat assessment 
(discussed on p. 10)? What exactly does targeted violence mean (see p. 1)? How do subjects of 
concern progress along the pathway towards violence (see p. 6)? There is a need to clarify such 
conventional yet controversial concepts in the field. More specifically, with regard to TAM 
interviewing, future research should strengthen and expand the interview manipulation 
techniques tested in the present studies in order to reach a fuller understanding of interview 
dynamics in TAM contexts. Furthermore, refinements to the current set-up should be made to 
optimise the balance between the reality of a threat paradigm, the real-life relevance of the 
paradigm to the participant sample, and research ethics. The realism of the paradigm might be 
improved by having participants threaten with an illegal act, for instance, to leak information 
covered by a confidentiality agreement signed by participants. Replications could further 
contribute to the robustness of the current findings, especially if conducted across different labs 
and samples. Eventually, mechanisms examined in laboratory studies must be tested in applied 
settings to prove the assumption of generalisability (see Limitations). 
The generalisability of interview approaches is limited by individual and cultural 
differences. There is a need to explore these limitations so that interview approaches can be 
customised for specific target groups. It has been suggested that cultural norms and values 
become more prominent under stress, meaning that stress leads people to fall back on the 
cultural habits with which they were raised, such as their native language (Giebels & Taylor, 
2012). Yet, cultural issues are not sufficiently studied within the field of threat assessment 
(Hart, 2016b). Cultural frameworks that could be explored include the distinction between low-
context cultures (i.e. cultures that use more direct and content-oriented communication) and 
high-context cultures (i.e. cultures that use more indirect and context-oriented communication; 
Giebels & Taylor, 2012) and, in the light of terrorism, aspects of Western and Muslim 
subcultures. Moreover, some individual characteristics are worth studying. For instance, 
researchers examining real-world interviews with extremists and terrorists have noted that such 
interviewees display little self-reflection (Alison, 2016) and strong dualistic worldviews (e.g. 
us/them, good/bad; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Future studies should incorporate measures that 
tap into these individual/group belief systems. Such research may help to establish a good fit 
between interview objective, interview strategy, and interviewee.  
A topic that might broaden the scope of future research is interviewing as a means to 
managing a threatening situation. The typical aim of TAM interviewing is to gather information 
to assess risk and recommend intervention measures. However, interviewing could also be 
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employed to steer the threatener away from violence. One strategy to evoke change in others is 
motivational interviewing (Miller, 1983). Motivational interviewing is typically used in clinical 
settings and rests on the idea that people are best persuaded by arguments they hear themselves 
defend. In other words, it is assumed that clients are more inclined to change destructive 
behaviours if they can bring up their own motives for change, instead of listening to arguments 
presented by others. Hence, the therapist tries to encourage the patient to talk about motivations 
for change, so-called “change talk”. Numerous studies have proven the efficacy of motivational 
interviewing (Hettema, Steele, & Miller, 2005). Another threat management strategy could be 
the use of counter-narratives (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Counter-narratives are stories providing 
a view of the world that challenges the narratives supporting violence or extremism (Braddock 
& Horgan, 2016). Counter-narratives are intended to cast doubt on a theatener’s plan or 
ideology in order to alter dangerous worldviews. While the use of counter-narratives is 
considered one of the U.S.’s core strategies in preventing extremist ideologies, researchers have 
only recently turned their attention to the development of evidence-based narratives (Beutel, et 
al., 2016; Braddock & Horgan, 2016). Finally, threat managers may use an interview to reach 
out to a threatener to offer practical help (James et al., 2010) or to seek mutual gain (Shapiro, 
2006). None of these strategies have been systematically tested in a TAM context. Yet, each of 
them may benefit threat management outcomes such as increased cooperation, higher likelihood 
of future interactions being constructive, de-escalation, and, ultimately, refrainment from 
violence.  
Currently, little is known about how or how well professionals interview threateners. 
The study of professionals included in this thesis (Study IV) examines what information they 
would search for when making a threat assessment. However, to address professionals’ skills 
for TAM interviewing, future research should include measures on how they would conduct an 
interview with a person of concern. For instance, to list the questions and explain the strategies 
that they would ask in a given case. Such direct measures, in which they actually perform a 
threat management task, might give more insight into their competence than questionnaires in 
which they are supposed to reflect on their daily work (e.g. “How do you typically perform this 
task”; “How do you think this task should be performed?”).  
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Ethical Considerations 
 
TAM interviewing in the laboratory 
  The experimental paradigm used in Studies I, II, and III required participants to make a 
threat or to discuss a threat they had made. The act of threatening as well as discussing the 
threat might have been stressful for the participants. Several efforts were made to minimise a 
potentially negative experience for the participants. To avoid or reduce moral constrains, the 
case given to participants was phrased in such a way that participants represented the party that 
was right according to widely accepted moral values and were to threaten a party that was 
morally wrong. Also, the harm participants threatened to inflict was not violent or otherwise 
unlawful but instead implied financial/reputational damage. 
To further ensure ethical research practices, all participants read and signed an informed 
consent in which they agreed to have understood participation is voluntary, confidential, and 
that the data would only be used for research purposes. The document specifically stated they 
were allowed to quit at any point in time. This, in fact, was done by 21 out of 496 participants 
(4.2%) because they felt uncomfortable with the interactive part of the study. They received 
full compensation. In the debriefing, all participants were given the opportunity to share their 
thoughts on the experiment. Subsequently, they were informed of the actual goal of the 
research, the position of the interviewer, the fictitious nature of the case, and, furthermore, it 
was emphasised that no one acted correctly or incorrectly in the experiment as there was no 
correct or incorrect behaviour.  
Approval for the studies was obtained from the Regional Ethical Review Board in 
Gothenburg (Studies I, II, and III) and the ethics committee at the University of Portsmouth 
(Study IV). For favourable decisions received, see Appendix A. 
 
TAM interviewing in practice  
Practitioners in the field of threat assessment and management can have many different 
professional backgrounds (e.g. police, law, medicine, behavioural science, security). Some 
professionals operate under governmental flags while others work for corporate businesses or 
run private consulting firms. Moreover, some professionals are full-time threat managers while 
others perform TAM tasks as an integral part of their jobs. The large diversity among threat 
assessment and management professionals is challenging to ethical conduct, but several efforts 
toward professionalisation have been made over the past three decades. For instance, the 
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American Threat Assessment Association published a code of conduct outlining professional 
standards of ethical practices (ATAP Code of Ethical Conduct, 2010). In addition, training and 
certification programmes have been developed and, since 2015, practitioners can apply for a 
“Threat Manager Certificate” that is awarded by ATAP. 
Despite these efforts, steps are yet to be taken to guarantee qualitative, ethical, and 
lawful practices in threat assessment and management. One of these steps is the further 
expansion of professionalisation from the US to other parts of the world. This trend is emerging 
with the rise of Canadian, European, and Asian sister organisations of ATAP. However, these 
organisations are much smaller than ATAP and, although accreditation processes are in 
progress, they are still in their infancies.  
Another step forward would be to develop conduct codes into more concrete 
implications for TAM interviewing (and other TAM tasks). For instance, it is stated in the 
conduct code that professionals should operate within the boundaries of their competence, and 
that they should respect privacy and confidentiality—but what does this mean in practice? Who 
exactly is authorised to conduct TAM interviews? Under what circumstances should these 
interviews take place? Can the interviewee refuse to take part? Who is responsible for managing 
the aftermath of the interview, including possible escalation? These questions remain 
unanswered.  
Finally, there exists no legal authority to guard ethical or lawful conduct in the field of 
threat assessment and management. Certified expertise thus stands or falls with 
acknowledgement in the field. Acknowledgement here means that professionals, clients, and 
organisations are aware of quality standards and choose to live up to these. Developing such a 
support base takes time and effort. However, as long as certification is not required by law, 
TAM practitioners remain free to practice their work however they see fit as long as it does not 
conflict with criminal law, civil law, or laws applying to their particular profession. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Current threat assessment and management (TAM) interviewing draws on customary 
knowledge, which can be explained as knowledge that has emerged over time and through 
experience and has been passed on through observational learning and storytelling (Hartwig et 
al., 2014). The present thesis seeks to advance this knowledge by proposing a science-based 
perspective on effective TAM interviewing; what dynamics can be expected and, given these 
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dynamics, what interview methods work best? Combining the theory and findings presented in 
this thesis, it could be concluded that threateners are semi-cooperative interviewees whose 
attitudes and behaviours may not be significantly influenced by general interview approaches 
(e.g. rapport-based interviewing, suspicion-oriented interviewing). Instead, the findings point 
to a need for more strategic approaches that (i) are developed from the perspective of the 
threatener so his/her existing attitudes can be anticipated and exploited, (ii) make the 
threatener’s motivation to be informative prevail over the need to be strategic, and (iii) strike a 
balance between controlling risk (by making risk assessments and placing restrictions) and 
meeting needs (by reaching out to the threatener and working towards a solution). Science-
based interview techniques should be developed that tap into one or more of these preliminary 
findings. Such developments will most likely improve the quality of TAM interviewing but 
may also lower the threshold for conducting such an interview in the first place. In turn, more 
real-world interviewing will give rise to new experiences and data that can serve as input for 
future research. It is this interplay between science and practice that is needed to advance the 
field of threat assessment and management. 
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  Abstract 
There is consensus about the importance to engage with, an if possible interview, individuals who 
threaten to cause harm. However, there exist little research on how to conduct such interviews. This 
paper contributes with an experimental approach on threat management interviewing. We explored what 
types of counter-interview strategies threateners employ, and we tested the efficacy of two common 
interview styles (direct interviewing vs. rapport-based interviewing). Participants (N = 120) were 
interviewed about a threat they had made, and reported what strategies they had used during the 
interview. No differences were found between protocols for threat management outcomes (i.e. 
information gain, use of counter-interview strategies, and willingness to discuss or enact the threat). 
However, the study showed how threateners stroke a deliberate balance between proving their stand and 
disguising implementation details. Critically, individuals with more serious intentions to enact the threat 
were more inclined to hide information from the interviewer. We argue that it is vital for threat 
management interviewing to i) understand what behaviors can be expected from the interviewee, and ii) 
learn about interview methods that can steer these behaviors towards information gain (which is 
beneficial to threat assessment) and towards de-escalation (which is the purpose of threat management). 
 
Keywords: threat management, threat assessment, investigative interviewing, counter-interview strategy 
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Threateners’ Counter-Interview Strategies 
Most threats of violence will never be enacted (Warren, Mullen, & McEwan, 2014), but the 
threats that are enacted often come with high costs (e.g. human lives, financial damage). This warrants 
a careful assessment of each individual threat. The goal for threat management is not to predict who will 
or will not commit harm, but rather to triage among a number of worrisome cases (James & Farnham, 
2016; Gill, 2015). In this triage process, threat managers typically express an overall level of concern 
(low, medium, high), and this level informs what interventions are needed to mitigate the risks for the 
individual case (Meloy, Hoffmann, Guldimann, & James, 2012). To reach such an assessment, 
information is needed about the subject of concern. For instance, threat managers must find out about 
the subject’s motivation, intentions, mental health, and his or her capability to cause harm (Vossekuil, 
Fein, & Berglund, 2015). In part this information can be extracted from databases (e.g. police, social 
services), but the most direct source of information is the subject him or herself. The importance of 
interviewing subjects of concern has been widely acknowledged in the literature on threat assessment 
and management (Calhoun & Weston, 2015; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998; van der Meer & Diekhuis, 2014). 
It is therefore surprising that there is hardly any research on how to conduct such interviews. The few 
publications that do exist on the theme draw largely on the authors’ professional experiences (e.g. Meloy 
& Mohandie, 2014; van der Meer & Diekhuis, 2014). This paper contributes with an experimental 
approach to threat management interviewing. We present a study on how to elicit valuable information 
from people who pose a threat—in this paper referred to as threateners. Specifically, the current study 
examines the efficacy of two general interview styles applied in law enforcement and intelligence 
contexts: direct interviewing and rapport-based interviewing (Alison, et al., 2014; Justice, Bhatt, 
Brandon, & Kleinman, 2010).  
Counter-Interview Strategies   
It could be argued that successful interviewing starts with understanding the interviewee’s 
perspective (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Perspective taking allows the interviewer to adapt to the 
strategies and the needs of the interviewee (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). Many 
interviewees in legal contexts are semi-cooperative, meaning that the interviewee benefits from 
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revealing some, but not all, information they hold. For instance, guilty suspects want to be perceived as 
truthful without disclosing incriminating details (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Tekin 
et al., 2015). Moreover, sources who hold information about an upcoming crime may want to warn the 
police without revealing that their friends are involved (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Granhag, Kleinman, & 
Oleszkiewicz, 2016). Threateners arguably face a similar dilemma; they need to make sure that they are 
taken seriously without being too specific about their intentions (Geurts, Ask, Granhag, & Vrij, 2016). 
Many interviewees must thus manage the information they reveal and the impression they make 
(Hartwig et al., 2010). Such management efforts are referred to as counter-interview strategies 
(Granhag, Clemens, & Strömwall, 2009). 
Interview techniques that build on the counter-interview strategies of interviewees have proven 
to be effective in suspect and source interviewing. One such technique is to withhold evidence from the 
suspect, so that guilty suspects (who wish to conceal incriminating details) produce more inconsistencies 
in their statements compared to innocent suspects (who wish to reveal what they know). This technique 
is referred to as the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Another 
way to anticipate the interviewees’ concern of revealing too much information is by creating the illusion 
that the information they hold is already known by the interviewer (Toliver, 1997). The ‘illusion of 
knowing it all’ is intended to elicit new information from the interviewee, while letting them believe 
they contributed with little or nothing. Recent empirical work has provided support for the efficacy of 
this tactic (Granhag et al., 2016; Oleszkiewicz, 2016; Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Kleinman, 2017).  
In order to develop such techniques for threat management purposes, we must first understand 
what counter-interview strategies threateners employ. A recent study on this topic showed that 
threateners were forthcoming, yet strategic (Geurts et al., 2016). When interviewed about the threat they 
had made, threateners were willing to share information but presented their case deliberatively (e.g. ‘I 
tried to show I was serious by pointing out that [..]’). This finding implies that individuals who pose a 
threat —just like suspects and sources— use self-regulative mechanisms during interviews. The present 
study advances this line of work by exploring what type of counter-interview strategies threateners 
employ.  
Rapport-Based Interviewing 
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The purpose of investigative interviewing is to obtain a reliable and complete account (Evans, 
Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010). This purpose can be achieved by asking open-ended 
questions in a business-like manner, so-called direct interviewing (Justice, et al., 2010). Direct 
interviewing is a common and straightforward interview style but it leaves little room for building 
rapport, which is considered important for gathering information (Milne, Shaw, & Bull, 2007; Meissner 
et al., 2014). A clear-cut definition of rapport is difficult to provide, but rapport-based interviewing is 
often explained as a friendly interview style that is characterised by acceptance, empathy, and respect 
for the interviewee’s autonomy (Saywitz, Larson, Hobbs, & Wells, 2015; Alison, et al., 2014).  
A recent literature review on effective interviewing concludes that the best information gatherers 
are those who can establish and maintain rapport throughout the interview (Bull, 2013). A meta-analysis 
provides support for this conclusion, demonstrating that information-gathering methods in which rapport 
is established are more successful in eliciting true confessions (while reducing the likelihood of false 
confessions), compared to accusatorial questioning methods (Meissner et al., 2014). In addition, rapport-
based interviewing has been found to increase the amount of useful information obtained from suspects 
(Alison, Alison, Noone, Elntib, & Christiansen, 2013), and to reduce the suspects’ use of counter-
interview strategies (Alison, et al., 2014). These findings fit well with field research showing that 
offenders report to be more willing to provide a truthful account in response to humane, honest, non-
dominant, and respectful interviewing (O Connor & Carson, 2005; Kebbell, Hurren, & Mazerolle, 2006).  
Direct interviewing as well as rapport-based interviewing are information-gathering methods 
(as opposed to accusatorial or confession-oriented methods) that are grounded in psychological theory 
and research on memory and communication (Hartwig, Luke, & Skerker, 2016). It is here presumed that 
methods that exploit basic principles of human dynamics are applicable to a wide variety of interview 
settings, including threat management interviewing.  
The Present Study 
  The first objective of this study was to explore the counter-interview strategies of persons who 
pose a threat. We argue that learning about interviewees’ counter-interview strategies is a necessary 
starting point for developing interview techniques for threat management. The second objective was to 
test the comparative efficacy of direct interviewing and rapport-based interviewing. Based on the 
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findings discussed above that interviewees are more cooperative and willing to be truthful in 
information-gathering interviews, we predicted that participants interviewed with a rapport-based 
interview protocol would use fewer counter-interview strategies (Hypothesis 1), provide more 
information (Hypothesis 2), display a lower willingness to enact the threat (Hypothesis 3), and display 
a higher willingness to interact (meet) with the conflicting party again (Hypothesis 4), compared to 
participants interviewed with a direct interview protocol. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
  One hundred and twenty students at the University of Gothenburg (33 men, 83 women, 4 other, 
Mage = 27.38 years, SD = 8.83 years) participated in the experiment on a voluntary basis. Participation 
took approximately 40 minutes and participants were compensated with 100 SEK (approx. 11 USD). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two interview conditions: direct interviewing (n = 60) or 
rapport-based interviewing (n = 60).  
Procedure  
  Participants were recruited for what was advertised as a study on ‘career challenges’. Upon 
arrival, they read a fictitious case about a work conflict between a consultancy company and a former 
employee. The case file revealed how the company had allegedly tricked recent graduates into unpaid 
internships by promising them a permanent position. After the internship, however, their contract was 
ended and the company had profited from free labor. A duped employee wrote a letter to the company 
in which s/he threatened to press charges against this malpractice, unless the company would financially 
compensate her/him for the work carried out. Participants were asked to imagine being this employee. 
See Appendix A for the full background story and the instructions to the participants. 
 First, participants were asked to list up to five reasons for why they would press charges at this 
point in time, as well as reasons for why they would not press charges at this point in time. This task 
was meant to stimulate the participants to think carefully about the case before they rated four items 
about their willingness to enact the threat (i.e. to press charges). Participants rated the extent to which 
(i) they believed they could win the case in a court of law, (ii) they thought the case was worth pursuing, 
even if it would be rather expensive, (iii) they thought the case was worth pursuing even if it would take 
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time, and (iv) they were likely to press charges (1 = not at all, 9 = very much; α = .85). The procedure 
was repeated for the participants’ willingness to interact with the company about their case; participants 
were first asked to list reasons for and against interacting with them at this point in time, and then rated 
the extent to which (i) they would be willing to communicate with the company if the company would 
contact them about their case, (ii) they would seek contact with the company to provide the company 
with information about their case, and (iii) they would seek contact with the company to gather 
information about their case (1 = not at all, 9 = very much; α = .64).  
Next, participants were informed that an employee of the internal security unit from the 
company would discuss the case with them. Participants were then given 10 minutes to prepare 
themselves for this meeting and they received additional information about their case (e.g. an overview 
of the hours they had worked for the company, the contact details of a counsellor). Participants were 
allowed to make notes and to bring those with them to the meeting. Furthermore, participants were told 
to keep in mind that ‘If you tell too much, the company might take advantage of the information you 
provide. If you tell too little, the company might not take you seriously’. This was supposed to reflect 
the information-management dilemma that interviewees in the legal arena typically face (Hartwig et al., 
2010; Granhag et al., 2016).  
 Immediately after the preparation phase, participants were brought to the meeting room. The 
role of the interviewer was played by one of two confederates (man and woman) who were blind to the 
hypotheses of the study. The interviewers conducted an equal number of interviews across conditions. 
All participants received the same 11 questions/prompts. The questions tapped into topics that are 
considered to be relevant in threat management (e.g. motivation, intentions, capacity; Vossekuil et al., 
2015). Half of the participants were approached with a direct interview protocol, meaning that the 
questions/prompts were asked straightforwardly. The other half were approached with a rapport-based 
interview protocol, meaning that the questions/prompts were phrased in a rapport-promoting manner. 
The interview protocols are displayed in Appendix B.  
After the interview, participants rated the same seven items as they had rated before the 
interview, about their willingness to enact the threat at this point in time (four items, α = .89), and about 
their willingness to interact with the company in the future (three items, α = .73). In addition, the 
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participants were asked to report if they had used a particular strategy when interacting with the 
interviewer (and if so, to describe this strategy). Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and 
current occupation. 
Protocol Pretesting  
The interview protocols were pretested in a separate study. A total of 141 participants (80 men, 
61 women) judged to what extent the interview protocols were rapport-promoting. Participants were 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and they were compensated 0.50 USD. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two interview protocols; the direct interview protocol (n = 73) or the 
rapport-based interview protocol (n = 68). First, participants read the fictitious case about the work 
conflict between the consultancy company and the former employee (see Appendix A) so that they 
would understand the context of the interview questions. Next, they listened to the interview questions 
as if they were the interviewee. Finally, participants rated 13 items reflecting elements of rapport (e.g. 
‘The interviewer understands the difficult situation that I am in’, see for all items Appendix C). The 
items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; α = .83).   
 In support of the design, participants exposed to the rapport-based interview protocol reported 
significantly higher ratings of rapport (M = 4.05, SD = 0.79) than participants exposed to the direct 
interview protocol (M = 3.55, SD = 0.96), t(139) = 3.43, p < .001, d = 0.58, 95% CI [0.24, 0.91].  
Coding  
Strategy use.  The strategies that the participants reported to have used were divided into six 
categories; prove capability, explain, conceal, self-presentation, negotiate, and other. Two categories, 
conceal and self-presentation, were drawn from previous research on counter-interview strategies of 
suspects (Hartwig et al., 2010) and two categories, prove capability and explain, were drawn from 
previous research on counter-interview strategies of threateners (Geurts et al., 2016). The category 
negotiate was added because of the business-like nature of the case (i.e. work conflict, financial request). 
Strategies that did not fit any of these five categories were coded as other. The participants could report 
more than one strategy. Two coders, both blind to the hypotheses of the study, categorised the strategies. 
Based on 20% of the material, an interrater agreement of 87% was established (Cohen’s κ = .65). After 
settling the disagreements, one coder coded the remaining material. 
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Information provision. All interviews were transcribed and coded for the amount and type of 
information disclosed. The background story given to the participants consisted of 45 pieces of 
information (see Appendix A). These information pieces suited the interview questions (see Appendix 
B). That is, the participants could use the background information to answer the questions that they were 
about to receive. For instance, the information piece ‘You kept track of your working hours while 
working for the company’ could be used to answer the question ‘Why do you think that your case is a 
strong case?’ Again, two coders, unaware of the hypotheses, coded 20% of the material. The coders 
counted which information pieces were present in each transcript and reached an interrater agreement 
of 89% (Cohen’s κ = .73). One coder continued coding the rest of the material.  
Results 
Hypotheses Testing  
Strategy use. Nearly all participants (n = 108, 90%) reported to have used a strategy during the 
interview. Almost half of them (n = 49, 45.4%) reported a single strategy, while the majority (N = 59, 
55.6%) stated to have used a combination of two to four different strategies. As can be seen in Table 1, 
the most frequently reported strategies were prove capability (‘Show them that my evidence would hold 
in court’) and conceal (‘Answer as vaguely as possible’). Other reported strategies were self-
presentation (‘Appear professional and credible’), explain (‘Make them understand my difficult 
situation’), negotiate (‘Show willingness to reach an agreement’), and other (‘Take over control by 
asking questions back’). The two strategies that were most often used in combination were prove 
capacity and conceal (n = 32).  
The number of participants who claimed to have used a strategy was the same across interview 
conditions (n = 54 [90%] in both conditions). Chi-square tests did not reveal any significant differences 
in the extent to which participants in the rapport-based interview condition and the direct interview 
condition reported to have used the different type of strategies, all ps < .343 (Bonferroni corrected). 
Thus, there was no effect of interview protocol on reported strategy use, meaning that Hypothesis 1 was 
not supported.  
Information provision. Participants were found to be moderately forthcoming, with an average 
disclosure of 12.74 (SD = 4.67) information pieces per person out of the total of 45 pieces (i.e. 28.3%). 
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An independent t-test revealed that participants in the rapport-based interview condition (M = 13.45, SD 
= 4.93) and direct interview condition (M = 12.05, SD = 4.37) did not differ significantly with respect 
to the amount of information provided, t(118) = 1.63, p = .106, d = 0.30, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.66]. This 
means that Hypothesis 2 is rejected.  
Willingness to enact. To test the effect of the interview on willingness to enact the threat, a 2 
(Protocol: direct vs. rapport-based) × 2 (Time: before interview vs. after interview) mixed ANOVA was 
performed with participants’ willingness ratings as the dependent measure. Cell means are reported in 
Table 2. No main effect of protocol was found, F(1, 118) = 0.69, p = .407, ƞp² = 0.006, 90% CI [.000, 
.048]. However, the analysis revealed a main effect of time, F(1, 118) = 12.79, p < .001, ƞp² = .098, 90% 
CI [.029, .187], indicating that participants were significantly more willing to enact the threat after (M 
= 6.35, SD = 1.81) than before the interview (M = 5.84, SD = 1.76). There was no significant Protocol 
× Time interaction, F(1, 118) = 1.42, p = .236, ƞp² = .012, 90% CI [.000, .063]. Thus, the amount of 
change between before- and after-interview ratings did not differ significantly between the two interview 
protocols, rejecting Hypothesis 3.  
Willingness to interact. To test the effect of the type of interview on participants’ willingness 
to interact with the company, a 2 (Protocol) × 2 (Time) mixed ANOVA was performed (for cell means, 
see Table 2). No main effect of interview protocol was found, F(1, 118) = 0.07, p = .794, ƞp² = .001, 
90% CI [.000, .024]. However, the analysis again revealed a main effect of time, F(1, 118) = 30.06, p < 
.001, ƞp² = .203, 90% CI [.104, .303], showing that participants were significantly less willing to interact 
with the company after (M = 5.29, SD = 2.10) than before the interview (M = 6.16, SD = 1.78). There 
was no significant Protocol × Time interaction, F(1, 118) = 2.39, p = .626, ƞp² = .020, 90% CI [.000, 
.078]. Thus, the rate of decline of willingness to interact with the company did not differ between the 
two interview protocols, rejecting Hypothesis 4. 
Exploratory Analyses 
The main analyses were conducted for the overall amount of information provided. However, 
from an applied perspective, some information might be more critical than other information. Hence, 12 
raters were asked to read the case and to select the 8 to 12 (out of 45) pieces of information that they 
considered to be the most critical for assessing the risk that the main character in the case would cause 
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harm. An independent t-test was conducted with the information pieces that were selected by five or 
more raters (n = 15). On average, participants revealed 5.80 (SD = 2.19) out of 15 pieces of this critical 
information. No significant difference was found between participants in the rapport-based interview 
condition (M = 6.07, SD = 2.36) and participants in the direct interview condition (M = 5.53, SD = 2.67), 
t(118) = 1.16, p = .248, d = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.57].  
To examine whether strategy choice influenced the amount and type of information provided, 
independent t-tests were conducted with respect to the two most frequently reported strategies—prove 
capability and conceal. First, participants with the strategy prove capability did not provide a 
significantly different amount of details on the implementation of the threat (M = 4.39, SD = 2.94) than 
did participants who did not employ this particular strategy (M = 3.85, SD = 2.57), t(118) = 1.07, p = 
.288, d = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.55]. Second, the participants who reported to have used the strategy 
conceal provided on average about two details less (M = 11.64, SD = 5.12) than did participants who 
did not use this particular strategy (M = 13.70, SD = 4.09), t(118) = 2.45, p = .016, d = 0.45, 95% CI 
[0.09, 0.81].  
In total, 56 participants reported to have used the strategy conceal. Some of these participants 
(n = 33) were vague in their descriptions about what information they withheld (e.g. ‘I left out the 
important details’), whereas others (n = 23) specified which type of information they concealed. The 
latter group reported to have concealed three types of information: (i) information about persons that 
could help them implement the threat (e.g. the names of a potential witness, companion, or legal 
counselor; n = 19), (ii) information on their own vulnerability (e.g. emotional or financial problems; n 
= 7), and (iii) specific pieces of evidence (e.g. documentation that proved their argument; n = 5). 
Participants could report to have concealed more than one type of information. 
Moreover, the participants who reported to have used the strategy conceal were found to be 
significantly more willing to enact the threat before the interview (M = 6.29, SD = 1.60) than were the 
participants who did not report to have used this particular strategy (M = 5.44, SD = 1.81), t(118) = 2.69, 
p = .008, d = 0.49, 95% CI [0.13, 0.86]. This finding might imply that those with more serious 
implementation intentions more often chose to conceal information. However, no correlation was found 
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between willingness to enact the threat and the amount of information provided, r = .069, p = .455, 95% 
CI [-.112, .245].  
Finally, we examined to what extent participants’ initial attitudes toward enacting the threat and 
attitudes toward interacting with the conflicting party (before-interview ratings) correlated with their 
attitudes after the interview. Positive correlations were found between before- and after-interview ratings 
for willingness to enact the threat, r = .604, p < .001, 95% CI [.476, .707], and willingness to interact 
with the conflicting party, r = .609, p < .001, 95% CI [.482, .711]. In a similar vein, only 21 participants 
(17.5%) changed the direction of their willingness to enact the threat (n = 7 willing to unwilling; n = 14 
unwilling to willing) after the interview compared to before, and only 29 (24.2%) of the participants 
changed the direction of their willingness to interact with the conflicting party (n = 23 willing to 
unwilling; n = 6 unwilling to willing). A change in direction was counted when participants rated an 
average value greater than 5 (on a 9-point Likert scale) before the interview, and an average value lower 
than 5 after the interview—and vice versa. Two 3 (Change: unwilling to willing; willing to unwilling; 
no directional change) × 2 (Protocol: direct vs. rapport-based) chi-square tests revealed no significant 
differences between interview conditions for the number of participants that changed the direction of 
their willingness to enact the threat, χ2(2, N = 120) = 0.52, p = .771, φ = .07, or to interact with the 
conflicting party, χ2(2, N = 120) = 0.05, p = .973, φ = .02. 
Discussion 
Main Findings 
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, to learn about threateners’ strategies, attitudes, and 
actual verbal behaviours when being interviewed about their intentions. Second, to examine how 
different interview styles (direct vs. rapport-based interviewing) may steer these behaviours towards 
successful interview outcomes. Threatening participants were found to be semi-cooperative. That is, 
prior to the interview they reported to be willing to discuss their case and provided almost one third of 
the information they held (and approximately 40% of the critical information they held). In addition to 
being forthcoming, almost all threateners (90%) reported to have presented their case strategically. The 
reported use of counter-interview strategies was higher than what is known from research on suspect 
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interviewing (37% - 60%; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007), but fits well with previous findings 
on counter-interview strategy use in threat management interviews (Geurts et al., 2016).  
The most frequently used strategies were to emphasise one’s capability to enact the threat and 
to hide information for the interviewer. This finding indicates that threat managers may benefit from 
interviewing subjects of concern. That is, people who wish to prove their capability need to reveal some 
information about their planning or preparations. Moreover, people who conceal information by 
definition withhold knowledge—knowledge that may be elicited by means of skilled interviewing. It is 
possible that the reported strategies reflected the information-management dilemma that the participants 
had to navigate (i.e. ‘If you tell too much, the company might take advantage of the information you 
provide. If you tell too little, the company might not take you seriously’). In defense of the paradigm, 
though, this is a dilemma that real-life threateners often face.  
Contrary to the expectations, the study did not support the relative superiority of rapport-based 
interviewing. No differences were found between protocols for the threateners’ strategy use, their 
information provision, or for their willingness to pursue or discuss the case. These outcomes contrast 
previous research supporting the efficacy of rapport-based interviewing over accusatorial or direct 
interviewing (Meissner et al., 2014; Bull, 2013). Two possible explanations for these findings are here 
suggested. The first is that the manipulation of rapport might not have been powerful enough to cause 
the predicted effects. The second is that rapport-building approaches might not be better than direct 
approaches in instrumental conflicts, such as the case scenario that was used in the present study (See 
also Limitations and Future Research).  
The initial attitudes of the interviewees were found to be predictive for the interview outcomes. 
Interviewees who were relatively more eager to implement the threat (or to interact with the conflicting 
party) before the interview, were also relatively more eager to do so after the interview. This finding 
matches a scientific review on motivational interviewing in clinical contexts, showing that the client’s 
attitude (e.g. motivation to change) is a stronger predictor of therapeutic outcomes than the therapist’s 
spirit as such (e.g. empathy or acceptance; Apodaca & Longabaugh, 2009).  
Importantly, participants who were initially more positive towards implementing the threat, 
more often chose to conceal information, and especially information on the actual implementation of the 
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threat (e.g. names of contact persons, specific pieces of evidence). Placing the finding in a broader 
perspective, threateners with serious intentions may employ more avoidant strategies than bluffers. This 
notion fits well with research on suspect interviewing, where guilty interviewees were found to adopt 
avoidant strategies (e.g. avoid incriminating details, keep it simple) more often than innocent 
interviewees did (Hines et al., 2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). Differences in counter-
interview strategies are presumed to result from different information management needs (i.e. the guilty 
must conceal the truth, whereas the innocent must reveal the truth), and strategic interview techniques 
build on such differences (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008).  
Furthermore, it was found that regardless of the interview style, interviewing had an escalating, 
rather than a de-escalating, effect. Threatening participants were more willing to enact the threat after 
the interview compared to before, and also, they were less willing to interact with the conflicting party 
after the interview compared to before. Reasonably, these attitude changes may have been a response to 
the interviewer’s rejection of the threateners’ demand at the very end of the interview (i.e. ‘the company 
will not pay you’). The impact of the rejection may have overshadowed the nuances of the interview, 
implying that the mere effect of interview styles are best tested without such a rejection. Yet it is realistic 
to think that rejections are likely to occur during interactions with people who threaten because their 
demands or behaviors are often unacceptable. The challenge in crisis communication is therefore to 
reduce tension, gather information, and work towards a solution, while simultaneously restraining 
unwanted behavior (Giebels & Taylor, 2010; van der Meer & Diekhuis, 2014). Thus, we argue that any 
valuable interview methods for threat management need to be effective despite the rejection or restraint 
that is communicated to the threatener.   
Limitations and Future Research 
The null findings that were observed when comparing the two interview styles may have been 
due to methodological limitations. First, the rapport-promoting elements in one of the interview 
protocols may have been too weak. The pilot study revealed that the rapport-based interview protocol 
was perceived as more rapport-promoting, compared to the direct interview protocol. Although this 
difference was significant (with a medium effect size), the ratings did not differ much in absolute terms 
(i.e. the rapport-based and direct protocols received average ratings of 4.05 and 3.55 on a 7-point scale, 
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respectively). Moreover, an average score of 4.05 on a 7-point scale suggests that the rapport-based 
protocol was rapport-promoting only to a moderate extent. This fact, plus the finding that initial counter-
interview strategies are difficult to change (Alison et al., 2013; Apodaca & Longabaugh, 2009), suggests 
that profound means are needed to steer interviewees’ behavior. One way forward could be to focus on 
specific interview techniques (e.g. strategic interview techniques) rather than general interview styles.  
Second, the case scenario concerned a work conflict and the interview aim was instrumental 
(i.e. financial compensation). It has been suggested that instrumental crises, with a typical win-lose 
structure, are best encountered with rational arguments rather than relational approaches (e.g. being kind, 
showing empathy; Giebels & Taylor, 2010). A future challenge in experimental research on threat 
dynamics is to build a paradigm that matches both the reality of the participant as well as the charged 
nature of threat cases. 
On a more general note, it could be argued that one specific type of interviewing—whether it is 
rapport-based, direct, or strategic—may not be effective in all threat management contexts. This study 
rested on the assumption that interview styles that are grounded in basic theories of human dynamics 
are broadly applicable. However, threat managers must deal with a variety of motives, cultures, and 
mental conditions. Arguably, such background variables should inform the (combination of) interview 
methods used in a particular case. For instance, communication with stalkers should perhaps focus on 
restraining the perpetrator’s behaviors (Kropp, Hart, Lyon, & Storey, 2011), whereas business-like 
conflicts are better solved by a rational discussion on the content of the conflict (Giebels & Taylor, 
2010). Moreover, building trust may be critical in communication with persons with personality 
disorders (Bender, 2005), whereas repairing loss of face may be particularly important when 
interviewing persons from collectivistic cultures (Giebels & Taylor, 2012). In other words, the success 
of threat management interviewing may depend on the extent to which the interview method fits the 
case characteristics. 
Concluding Remarks 
The current findings suggest that threateners are semi-cooperative, which speaks to the 
importance of skilled interviewing in the field of threat management. No differences in threat 
management outcomes (i.e. information gain, counter-interview strategies, de-escalation) were found 
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when comparing direct interviewing with rapport-based interviewing. However, the study showed how 
threatening interviewees stroke a deliberate balance between proving their stand and disguising 
implementation details. Especially those with more serious intentions to enact the threat were restrictive 
in terms of providing information during the interview. Current knowledge on threat management 
interviewing rests on best practices rather than science. To strengthen the foundation of threat 
management interviewing, we argue, more experimental research is needed on behaviors that can be 
expected from the interviewee, and on interview techniques that can exploit these behaviors. 
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Table 1 
Frequencies of Threateners’ Self-Reported Counter-Interview Strategies 
  Interview protocol  
Strategy Total Direct Rapport χ2 
Prove capability  59 (49.2%) 34 (56.7%) 25 (41.7%) 2.70 
Conceal  56 (46.7%) 32 (53.3%) 24 (40.0%) 2.14 
Self-presentation  27 (22.5%) 9 (15.0%) 18 (30.0%) 3.87 
Explain 21 (17.5%) 8 (13.3%) 13 (21.7%) 1.44 
Negotiate 9 (7.5%) 5 (8.3%) 4 (6.7%) 0.12 
Other 18 (15.0%) 10 (16.7%) 8 (13.3%) 0.26 
No strategy 12 (10.0%) 6 (10.0%) 6 (10.0%) 0.00 
Note. Threateners could report more than one strategy; thus, percentages do not add up to 100%. The χ2 
values refer to the difference between the direct and rapport-based interview conditions in the proportion 
of participants who reported the strategy. None of these tests were statistically significant at p < .05 
(Bonferroni corrected). 
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Table 2 
Means of Before- and After-Interview Ratings as a Function of Interview Protocol  
 Willingness to enact  Willingness to interact 
Interview protocol Before After  Before After 
Direct 5.87 (1.74) 6.56 (1.68)  6.24 (1.81) 5.29 (2.14) 
Rapport 5.80 (1.79) 6.15 (1.93)  6.08 (1.75) 5.28 (2.08) 
Note. Both willingness to enact and willingness to interact were rated on a 9-point Likert scale. 
Values in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
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Appendix A 
Instructions to the participant 
Background 
Imagine the following scenario. You recently graduated from university and Boston & 
Company—a leading company in your field— offered you a job. You happily accepted the offer and 
signed a contract stating that the first half year would be an unpaid internship and after this period, by 
mutual consent, the contract would be changed into a paid and permanent position. 
The internship was demanding and you had worked hard during weekdays, 
evenings, weekends, and holidays. Your colleagues and the manager appreciated your work. However, 
to your surprise, the company decided to end your contract after half a year because, according to them, 
you did not live up to the company’s standards in terms of effort and quality of work. 
 The decision of the company shocked you. Not only did it affect your self-esteem but it also 
caused you financial problems. You had taken a bank loan to cover your life expenses during the unpaid 
period. You had never worried about this loan because the company gave you the impression that the 
permanent contract was just a formality. Suddenly you were unemployed and jobs in your field are 
scarce.  
Now, five months later, you found out via friends that two other young professionals 
experienced exactly the same at Boston & Company. This information strengthened your idea that the 
company had mistreated you. As you were newly graduated with little experience of contracts and 
careers, you felt they tricked you with a false promise and profited from half a year of free labor, while 
you were left with depts.  
You decided to claim a salary for the period that you worked for the company. However, you 
realise that simply asking for money won’t work. You thought that there are two ways to get 
compensated for you work: i) you press charges with the hope that the court forces the company to pay 
you, or ii) you make the company believe that you have a strong case, and that they will be willing to 
pay you the money in order to prevent you from pressing charges. 
Additional information concerning your case: i) You kept track of your working hours while 
you were working for the company. You still have these notes and you calculated that you had worked 
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an average of 60 hours per week, ii) A former colleague from the company told you that she has access 
to internal documentation showing that the work you delivered was of excellent quality, iii) Your friend 
gave you the names of two other persons with similar experiences working for the company, and iv) 
You have the contact details of a legal counsellor who is specialised in corporate law.  
Instructions 
You have written a letter to Boston & Company in which you made clear that if they don’t 
retrospectively pay you a salary, you will press charges against them. Boston & Company have received 
the letter and consulted Robin—an employee working for the Security Unit of Boston & Company—to 
talk with you about this matter.  
You have now 10 minutes to prepare yourself for the talk with Robin. Your ultimate goal is to 
get your salary payed retrospectively (either by pressing charges or by making them believe that you 
will press charges), use the interview to achieve this goal. Keep this in mind when talking to Robin; if 
you tell too much, the company might use this information against you. If you tell too little, the 
company might not take you seriously. 
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Appendix B  
Interview protocols 
Direct 
[1] My name is Robin. Boston & Company asked me to talk with you about the letter that you 
have sent us. I would like to ask you a few questions. [2] Could you explain to me how the company 
decision to end your contract has affected you? [3] Why did you decide to take action now, 5 months 
later? [4] What do you seek to achieve with this? [5] What exactly are you planning to do? [6] 
Proceeding with this case will be difficult. How have you prepared for this? [7] Why do you think 
your case is strong? [8] What will you do if we don’t pay you the money? [9] What will you do if you 
don’t win the case in court? [10] I already know that the company will not pay you a salary in 
retrospect. My advice is to drop the case and accept the situation. [11] I will be your contact person on 
this matter (business card is offered). You can call me if you have more information or questions 
concerning your case. 
Rapport-based 
[1] My name is Robin. Boston & Company asked me to talk with you about the letter that you 
have sent us. I would like to ask you a few questions but of course it is your choice whether or not you 
want to answer those questions. [2] I have understood from your letter that you have worked for 
Boston & Company during a six months internship in which you devoted much time and energy to the 
company. You were promised a paid and permanent position after the internship but the company 
ended your contract. Could you explain to me how this decision has affected you? [3] The sudden 
ending of the contract must have come as a surprise for you back then. I understand that you may have 
felt defeated at first but why did you decide to take action now, 5 months later? [4] Just to make sure 
that I understand you correct, what is it that you seek to achieve with this? [5] You don’t have to tell 
me this of course but what exactly are you planning to do? [6] I know from my experience working for 
security units of different companies, that proceeding cases like these can be difficult for the plaintiff, 
which you are in this case. May I ask you how you have prepared for this? [7] I believe that you are a 
reasonable person. Still, we have to look at the facts, why do you think that your case is a strong case? 
[8] What will you do if we don’t pay you the money? [9] What will you do if you don’t win the case in 
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court? [10] I have heard your side of the story and I will report this to the company. But I have to be 
honest with you. I already know that the company will not pay you a salary in retrospect because the 
contract that you signed doesn’t allow for that. My advice to you is to drop the case and to accept the 
situation. As I see it, you are still young and I’m sure that you will face plenty of great career 
opportunities in the future. [11] I will be your contact person on this matter (business card is offered). 
You can call me if you have more information or questions concerning your case. 
 
Note: The Italic phrasings indicate differences between protocols. 
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Appendix C 
Questionnaire protocol pretesting 
In your role as interviewee, rate your agreement with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree; 
7 = strongly agree) 
1. The interviewer's approach is friendly  
2. The interviewer wants to know what I have to say        
3. The interviewer is confrontational  
4. The interviewer understands the difficult situation that I am in  
5. The interviewer is trying to get the best outcome for both of us  
6. I can choose not to answer a question and the interviewer would respect that  
7. The interviewer is judgmental  
8. I can share the problems I have with my former employer and the interviewer would want to listen 
to this  
9. The interviewer lacks understanding of my situation 
10. The interviewer would accept my answers even if he would disagree with them  
11. I think that the interviewer is able to see the situation from my point of view  
12. The interviewer fails to take my perspective  
13. The interviewer wants to help me out of this difficult situation 
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Appendix H: Manuscript Study IV  
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